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Reshaping College Athlete Sports Betting Education
Becky Harris* & John T. Holden**
Legal sports wagering has been rapidly expanding across the
United States since 2018. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s
Murphy decision, more than twenty-five states have legalized
sports betting and billions of dollars have followed the cascades of
legalization. As the legal market continues to grow, professional
sports leagues have been quick to embrace the regulated
expansion, but the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) has not changed their steadfast opposition. Despite the
NCAA’s vehement opposition, the organization has seemed to
gain little traction in getting states to either wholly exclude
wagering on collegiate sports or getting the federal government to
preempt these nascent state initiatives.
The NCAA’s opposition to sports betting expansion is futile.
Despite the organization’s reluctance to embrace the now
mainstream activity, the time has come for the organization to
acknowledge the reality of the situation and create an environment
that provides a modernized means of protecting college athletes
from those who may wish to do them harm for gambling purposes.
The expansion of legal sports betting is likely to be a net positive
for the integrity of both betting markets and sporting events. As
sports bettors begin accessing the legal regulated sports wagering
market in larger numbers, illegal products and markets will likely
become less attractive alternatives. The time has come for the NCAA,
collegiate athletic conferences, and colleges and universities to
Both authors contributed equally to this Article. Names appear in random order.
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take the steps necessary to coexist with widespread legal betting
markets. This Article provides the necessary framework for
collegiate sports organizations to move forward with modernizing
sports wagering education and awareness for collegiate athletes
through (a) adopting best practices; (b) establishing reporting
processes; and (c) creating a necessary system of education that
provides additional measures of protection and awareness of the
threats brought on by nefarious individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 2019, the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York filed a letter to Judge Vera Scanlon in support
of its motion for permanent orders of detention for five defendants
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awaiting trial.1 The motion for permanent detention followed a
lengthy multi-agency investigation into the Colombo crime family
in New York.2 The letter from the U.S. Attorney described a range
of crimes that had been unsealed as part of a thirty-one-count
indictment the day before, including racketeering, extortion,
loan-sharking, and operating illegal gambling businesses.3 The
letter, however, also revealed conversations picked up as part of a
wiretap, including one with a man charged in a separate indictment
named Benjamin Bifalco.4 According to the letter, Bifalco “laid out
his plan to fix the outcome of an NCAA men’s basketball game by
offering to pay thousands of dollars to multiple members of a
basketball team so that they would intentionally lose by a lot . . . .”5
The plan fell through and, according to the letter, the charged
defendants were skeptical of Bifalco’s abilities to accomplish a fix,
with one defendant referring to him as “an idiot.”6
On February 20, 2020, Bifalco would withdraw his original not
guilty plea and enter a guilty plea to a single count of the federal
Sports Bribery Act.7 On entering his guilty plea, Bifalco
acknowledged that he had approached a men’s National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) player and offered him money to
shave points, or lose by more than the point spread on the game.8
1. Letter from Richard P. Donoghue, U.S. Attorney, to Vera M. Scanlon, U.S. Mag. J.,
in Support of Motion for Permanent Orders of Detention, United States v. Amato, No. 19-442
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Letter to Judge Scanlon].
2. Id. at 2. The Colombo family is one of five New York organized crime families. It
was founded in 1928, by Joseph Profaci. Lydia Venn, Everything You Need to Know About the
Colombo Family in Netflix’s Fear City, THE TAB, https://thetab.com/uk/2020/07/23/
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-colombo-family-in-netflixs-fear-city-167794 (last
visited Oct. 27, 2021). Amongst the Colombo crime family’s historical criminal activities are fixing
and manipulating the outcomes of sporting events. See Dennis Dodd, How to Fix a College Football
Game and Influence Its Outcome—in Four Steps, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 17, 2018, 12:26 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/how-to-fix-a-college-football-gameand-influence-its-outcome-in-four-steps/.
3. Letter to Judge Scanlon, supra note 1, at 4–5.
4. Id. at 5–6.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id.
7. Criminal Cause for Pleading, United States v. Bifalco, No. CR-19-00444 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 20, 2020); see also 18 U.S.C. § 224.
8. David Purdum, Man Pleads Guilty for Trying to Bribe Player to Fix a Division I Game
in 2018, ESPN (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/
_/id/28744266/man-pleads-guilty-trying-bribe-player-fix-division-game-2018. A point-spread
bet is a type of wager that is meant to equalize both teams. The favorite in this type of wager
needs to win by more than the advantage prescribed by the bookmaker, a failure to win by
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The purported plan was for Bifalco to make payments to three
Wagner College basketball players, paying them a total of $7,500 to
lose by more than 20 points in a December 2018 game against
St. John’s University.9 In the end, Bifalco was unable to pull the
strings necessary to accomplish, as his own attorney referred to it,
the “half-hearted and hair-brained” fix.10 Despite Bifalco’s failed
endeavor, attempts to fix college sporting events have been
a cottage industry for criminal organizations and some neighborhood
bookies for more than seventy years in the United States.11
Contemporary American match-fixing scandals have occurred
overwhelmingly at collegiate institutions.12 While match-fixing
scandals are not an everyday occurrence in collegiate sports,
scandals have arisen, on average, several times a decade dating
back to the 1950s.13 Indeed, the NCAA’s fear of an increase in
match-fixing was one of the prominent reasons that the
organization advocated for a ban on sports wagering.14
more than that amount results in a “win” for the other team. It creates a handicap on one
team to theoretically make the two teams evenly matched. What Is a Point Spread? Betting
Odds and Strategy, LINES, https://www.thelines.com/betting/point-spread/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2021).
9. Zach Braziller, Alleged Wagner Basketball ‘Fixer’ Didn’t Have Connections to Pull Off
Bribe, N.Y. POST (Aug. 7, 2020, 7:33 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/08/07/alleged-wagnerbasketball-fixer-didnt-have-connections-to-pull-off-bribe/.
10. Letter from Vincent J. Martinelli, Att’y at Law, to I. Leo Glasser, U.S. Senior Dist.
J., Bifalco Sentencing Memorandum 4, United States v. Bifalco, No. 19-CR-444 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
7, 2020).
11. See Ante Z. Udovicic, Special Report: Sports and Gambling a Good Mix—I Wouldn’t
Bet on It, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 401, 424–27 (1998) (outlining many of the prominent gamefixing scandals in collegiate sports between 1945 and 1998); see also A Look at Some Notable US
Game-Fixing Scandals, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 17, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/
203c6e115d464363b4d39c6a4451bf1d (detailing a timeline of American college and
professional match-fixing incidents).
12. Udovicic, supra note 11, at 424–27.
13. See Becky Harris, Regulated Sports Betting: A Nevada Perspective, 10 UNLV GAMING
L.J. 75, 83–86 (2020).
14. The NCAA and its member institutions have argued repeatedly that sports betting
should be prohibited as a means to protect the integrity of NCAA sporting events. See
Legislation Prohibiting State Lotteries from Misappropriating Professional Sports Service Marks:
Hearing on S. 1772 Before the Subcomm. on Pats., Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 68 (1990) (statement of Richard Hilliard, Director of Enforcement
NCAA) (“There is no doubt that the institution of State-sponsored gambling schemes would
demean not only the integrity of intercollegiate sports, but also would invade the property
rights of our member institutions.”); see also David Porter & Regina Garcia-Cano, Easier
Gambling Has Sports Worried About Fighting the Fix, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://apnews.com/article/42b09c7fd1764bf196b13d5c44b2a188 (noting the historical
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The NCAA’s vocal opposition to legalized sports wagering was
supported by their professional league counterparts for most of the
last seventy years, until 2014 when the National Basketball
Association (NBA) Commissioner, Adam Silver, announced in a
prominent New York Times op-ed that his league no longer
supported a broad-based ban.15 While legalization would not
broadly begin to take foot until nearly four years later, when the
Supreme Court ruled in Murphy v. NCAA that the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) violated the Constitution’s
anti-commandeering clause,16 the Silver op-ed marked a noticeable
shift in attitudes from professional sports leagues.17 While the
NCAA continues to oppose any form of wagering, legal or illegal,
the reality is that legalized sports betting continues to grow in
popularity across the United States.18 Many states view sports
betting as an opportunity to generate revenue without raising
income or property taxes, something that is increasingly attractive
as state budgets become strapped.19
Despite the changing stance of jurisdictions around the country,
the NCAA has remained steadfast in its opposition to wagering in
both its legal and illegal forms, choosing to continue its “Don’t Bet

opposition to legal gambling being, in part, based on fears that more gambling would lead
to an increased number of fixed games). The opposition to legal sports gambling by an
organization like the NCAA is, perhaps, ironic because legal betting operators have both an
interest and in many instances an obligation to notify sports leagues of suspicious activity,
something that is not present in illegal markets. See Guy Bentley, Legalized Sports Betting: The
Best Defense Against Corruption, REASON (May 11, 2018), https://reason.org/commentary/
legalized-sports-betting-the-best-defense-against-corruption/ (describing how a legal market
encourages cooperation between law enforcement, bookmaking operators, and sports leagues).
15. Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalizesports-betting.html.
16. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018).
17. David Purdum, The Impact of Adam Silver’s Sports Betting Op-Ed Five Years Later,
ESPN (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/28068000/the-impactadam-silver-sports-betting-op-ed-five-years-later.
18. See
Legislative
Tracker:
Sports
Betting,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REP.,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2021)
(noting legislative initiatives to legalize sports betting across the United States).
19. See Rey Mashayekhi, As States Face Budget Shortfalls, Cannabis and Sports Betting
Could Flourish, FORTUNE (Oct. 31, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/10/31/statebudget-shortfalls-cannabis-sports-betting (describing ballot measures allowing both sports
betting and the legalization of recreational marijuana).
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On It” education program.20 While “Don’t Bet On It” may be well
intended, the program, which can be completed in about fifteen
minutes,21 lacks a connection to the current reality that is the
presence of widespread legal gambling around the country.22
Regardless of the NCAA’s position on the wisdom of legal sports
betting, the reality is that legal sports betting is here, and the
majority of states have legalized the activity while the NCAA
remains committed to an outdated program that is suboptimal in
terms of both the betting markets and protecting student athletes.
This Article proposes that the NCAA should take meaningful
steps to acknowledge the existence of the legal betting market and
play a meaningful role in safeguarding the integrity of legal betting
markets while providing enhanced education and reporting outlets
for athletes at their member schools. This Article proceeds in four
parts. Part I briefly examines the history of sports gambling in the
United States. Part II discusses the relationship between sports
gambling and match-fixing and why this has been a concern for the
NCAA. Part III describes the shortcomings of the current programs
used by the NCAA. Finally, Part IV provides the guideposts to a
system that better protects student athletes and adds additional
protections for regulated betting markets.
I. SPORTS BETTING ACROSS THE UNITED STATES OVER TIME23
Sports and betting on sports is a practice that dates back to some
of the earliest competitions.24 Sporting events in Ancient Greece
frequently saw spectators place wagers on the expected winners in

20. Sports Wagering, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/sports-wagering
(last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
21. See Timothy Mowrer, Jeffrey W. Wimer, Rebecca J. Mowrey & Daniel F. O’Neill, A
Study of NCAA Gambling Prevention Videos on Gambling Perceptions Within a NCAA Division II
Baseball Team, 9 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 379, 388 (2016) (describing the length of the main
“Don’t Bet On It” program being “about 15 minutes”).
22. Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every
State Stands, ESPN (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/
the-united-states-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization (describing the status
of sports betting in all fifty states).
23. For a more in-depth overview of sports gambling in the United States, see John T.
Holden & Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Sports Gambling and the Law: How America
Regulates Its Most Lucrative Vice, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 907, 910–24 (2020).
24. Arthur Charpentier, A Brief History of Sports Betting, FREAKONOMETRICS (Apr. 18,
2019), https://freakonometrics.hypotheses.org/58041.
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the venues where the competitions took place.25 In the 1600s,
bookmakers began to handicap horse races for the British
aristocracy.26 Horse racing would also become a popular activity in
the American colonies, which would host their first race in New
York in 1665.27 Horse racing would become a popular leisure
pursuit in all thirteen colonies, and interstate horse racing gained
popularity with the invention of the telephone and totalizer
machines in the 1800s.28 In addition to horse racing, pedestrian
races were hugely popular in Britain and the United States.29 By the
late 1800s, Americans had expressed an interest and willingness to
wager on seemingly any contest, placing bets amongst themselves in
the stands of amateur, collegiate, and eventually professional games.30
A. Pre–World War II Era in the United States
America, in the early part of the 1900s, was reeling from a series
of lottery scandals that had resulted in Congress banning the use of
the Postal Service from distributing lottery materials, and then
banning the distribution of lottery materials through interstate
commerce.31 The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers in the 1903 Lottery Case.32 During this early part of
the twentieth century, the NCAA was founded with the early goals
of protecting the health and safety of athletes and drawing a line
between amateurs and professionals.33 The lottery scandals would
be followed by allegations that eight members of the Chicago White
Sox conspired with gamblers to throw the 1919 World Series
25. Id.; see also Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 910–11 (tracing betting on sports
to competitions in 3,000 B.C.).
26. Charpentier, supra note 24.
27. Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 911.
28. Id. The totalizer system differs from a fixed-odds system as pari-mutuel odds are
adjusted based on how much is being wagered on each horse (or subject matter of the wager).
The total amount wagered is split amongst the winning bettors after subtracting the house’s
commission. See Kit Chellel, The Gambler Who Cracked the Horse-Racing Code, BLOOMBERG
(May 3, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-03/thegambler-who-cracked-the-horse-racing-code.
29. DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, ROLL THE BONES: THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING 337–38 (2006).
30. Id. at 338.
31. Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 912.
32. Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Holden & Edelman, supra
note 23, at 912.
33. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 9, 10–12 (2000).
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against the Cincinnati Reds.34 The fixing of the 1919 World Series is
likely America’s most prominent sporting event manipulation,
while the corruption of college sports in the United States has been
far more common than in their professional counterparts.35 The
scandal shocked the country, and led to a trial of eight members of
the White Sox team and caused Major League Baseball (MLB) to
establish the Office of the Commissioner, who was tasked with
ensuring that the future integrity of the game would be
maintained.36 By the early 1920s, a movement similar to that which
pushed for the prohibition of alcohol succeeded in pushing out
nearly all legal horse racing while many other gambling activities
continued to persist illegally.37 By the turn of the decade, however,
numerous states had begun to allow pari-mutuel betting on horse
races as a way to raise revenue.38 The 1930s saw the rise in
popularity of football pool betting, where participants would
“select several winners from a pool.”39
In March of 1931, in the midst of the Great Depression, the
Nevada legislature voted to legalize casino gambling.40 Other states
also flirted with expanding the legalization of gambling offerings
for residents, including Florida and Maryland who authorized slot
machines, and Montana which allowed religious and charitable

34. Brett Smiley, A History of Sports Betting in the United States: Gambling Laws and
Outlaws, SPORTS HANDLE (Nov. 13, 2017), https://sportshandle.com/gambling-lawslegislation-united-states-history/; Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 912–13.
35. See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and
Economics Approach, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 453, 455–58 (2015) (describing, briefly, the impetus for
the Sports Bribery Act and illustrating some high-profile incidents in the first half of the
20th century).
36. Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 912–13. The scandal was not the first to affect
professional baseball. Indeed, it was revealed that the previous year’s World Series had also
potentially been fixed and at least one White Sox fixer was jealous that he was not paid as
much as players had been to execute the prior fix. Id. During the early years of professional
baseball, the sport was regarded as “innately corrupt.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 338.
Indeed, the 1919 fix was one of a number of fixes during that time period of professional
baseball. In fact, the first match-fixing scandal involving professional baseball teams is
believed to have arisen in 1877, when four members of the Louisville Grays accepted money
from a gambling ring to intentionally lose games. Id.
37. DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITIONS AND THE
INTERNET 26 (2005).
38. Id.
39. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 339–40.
40. Nevada Legalizes Gambling, HISTORY (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.history.com/
this-day-in-history/nevada-legalizes-gambling; Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 914–15.
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organizations to operate slot machines and punch board games.41
The 1940s would also see the rise of racing wire services that would
transmit not only horse race results on an interstate basis, but also
the results of sporting events.42 The wire services enabled the rapid
dissemination of sports information around the country at a time
when many would not be able to learn about the results of a game
or race until the arrival of a newspaper the following day.43
B. The Rise of a Monopoly in the Desert
In the 1940s, point-spread betting began to grow in popularity
around the country.44 The increased interest in sports betting saw
Nevada bookmakers accepting wagers on professional sports.45
The practice of allowing sports betting as well as casino-style
gambling would establish Nevada as the only state accepting legal
wagers on professional sporting events until Delaware began
accepting parlay-style wagers on National Football League games
in 1976.46 Initially, legal sports wagers in Nevada were placed at
so-called Turf Clubs, which operated as separate entities from
casinos.47 While Nevada regulated casino gambling in the state,
sports betting was initially permitted, but not regulated by the state
government.48 Nevada’s regulation was an anomaly, as in much of
the country’s organized crime ran the gambling operations. In 1951,
Congress sought to fight back against organized crime’s profits by
imposing a ten percent tax on sports betting revenues.49 The ten
percent tax likely had little deterrent effect on illegal gambling, but
because the federal government’s tax did not discriminate between
legal and illegal sports gambling revenue, the illegal operators who
did not pay the tax and risk identifying their illegal business

41. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 26–27.
42. Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 415–16.
43. Id.
44. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 372–73.
45. Harris, supra note 13, at 76.
46. See Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Del. 1977)
(noting that the Delaware lottery’s football games commenced during the week of September
12, 1976); see also Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 924–25.
47. Harris, supra note 13, at 76; Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 415.
48. Harris, supra note 13, at 76.
49. Id.; Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 915.
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continued to operate, retaining all their profits, whereas legal
operations were rendered unprofitable by the tax.50
C. Congress Takes Aim at Sports Betting
To counter illegal gambling facilitated by organized crime, in
the early 1950s, Congress established the Kefauver Committee,
headed by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver, to travel the country
and hold hearings to investigate the scope of organized crime in the
United States.51 The televised hearings had tens of millions of
viewers and reached the determination that much of organized
crime’s activities were financed through their illegal gambling
endeavors.52 The Kefauver Commission would produce a number
of recommendations, though it would not be until 1961 that
Congress would pass the first derivative legislation.53 In 1961,
Congress would pass a series of laws aimed at organized crime’s
gambling operations: the Wire Act,54 the Wagering Paraphernalia
Act,55 and the Travel Act.56
The Wire Act prohibited the interstate transmission of bets, as
well as the interstate transmission of information that assists in the
placing of bets.57 The Wagering Paraphernalia Act prohibited the
interstate transportation of materials that assist in operating
bookmaking operations as well as operating sports betting pools.58
Relatedly, the Travel Act criminalized interstate travel with intent
to engage in unlawful activity, effectively allowing the federal
government to federalize state crimes that were committed by

50. Harris, supra note 13, at 76; Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 915.
51. John T. Holden, Through the Wire Act, 95 WASH. L. REV. 677, 693 (2020); Holden &
Edelman, supra note 23, at 915–16.
52. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 71–72.
53. Holden, supra note 51, at 693.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 917.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1961); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 917.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 917.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1084; see also Holden, supra note 51, at 722–23 (describing what
information courts have found assists in placing of bets or wagers). The Wire Act has been
held to apply exclusively to sports wagers. N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 62
(1st Cir. 2021).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 917.
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out-of-state residents.59 This trifecta of statutes were the Kennedy
administration’s first efforts to disrupt the revenue-generating
capacity of organized crime.60
In 1964, Congress would shift their interest from betting to the
related organized crime activity of game fixing.61 The Sports
Bribery Act made it a federal crime to “influence, in any way, by
bribery any sporting contest.”62 The legislation came on the back of
a law passed in 1947, which covered the District of Columbia, that
prohibited bribing players to lose a game.63 The Sports Bribery Act
was endorsed and lobbied for by both the President of the NCAA,
as well as then Commissioner of the National Football League
(NFL), Pete Rozelle, who cited a growing number of sports scandals
brought about by gamblers as a reason necessitating the statute.64
The 1950s had seen the NCAA plagued by a number of game
fixing scandals, including allegations involving some of the
organization’s top men’s basketball programs.65 The passage of the
Sports Bribery Act in 1964 was the last major federal statute that
impacted sports betting during the 1960s.66
59. The intent of the travel would require being engaged in illegal activity; however,
the law remains a broad expansion of the federal government’s criminal law authority. See
18 U.S.C. § 1952.
60. See Brett Smiley, Mailbag Mythbusting: The ‘Kitchen Sink’ Statutes, SPORTS HANDLE
(June 25, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/mailbag-mythbusting-the-kitchen-sink-statutes/
(noting that the Wire Act, Travel Act, and Wagering Paraphernalia were part of at least seven
different bills introduced in 1961 to target organized crime).
61. See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and
Economics Approach, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 454, 454–57 (providing an overview of the climate that
led to passage of the Sports Bribery Act); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 13.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 224(a) (1994).
63. John Holden, The Sports Bribery Act: A Look Back at Attempts to Aid Integrity, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (May 30, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20813/sports-integrity-inthe-us-history/.
64. Id. Rozelle testified,
American athletes are being subjected to guile and temptation by some of
America’s most despicable element [sic], the bribers, the fixers, and gamblers.
Though only a comparatively few of the tens of thousands of honest professional
and collegiate athletes of this country have succumbed to the mounting pressures
and enticements brought to bear by the gambling fraternity, the increasing number
of sports scandals, uncovered in recent years have been a source of chagrin and
dismay to all of us.
65. James Piereson, The Big Fix, CITY J. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/big-fix-15466.html.
66. See generally Ryan Rodenberg, When It’s Legal to Rig a Sports Game (and Why It
Shouldn’t Be), ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/
archive/2013/02/when-its-legal-to-rig-a-sports-game-and-why-it-shouldnt-
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Congress continued their interest in pursuing gambling, which
they viewed as a funding mechanism for organized crime through
the 1970s.67 Congress also expressed dissatisfaction with state-level
efforts to prioritize gambling-related offenses.68 The passage of the
Illegal Gambling Business Act allowed the federal government to
take action against any gambling business that operated in
contravention of state law, had more than five associates, and
received gross single-day revenue exceeding $2,000, or was in
substantially continuous operation for 30 days or more.69 However,
during the 1970s while Congress was vastly expanding the federal
government’s ability to target gambling operations nationwide,
Nevada Senator Howard Cannon successfully convinced his
colleagues to reduce the gambling excise tax from ten percent to
two percent.70 The eight percent drop in federal taxation of sports
wagers saw casinos take a greater interest in bringing Turf Clubs
inside the casino doors, and by the 1980s most Turf Clubs had been
replaced by race and sports books.71 Even with the reduction in the
federal excise tax on sports wagers, however, the economics of
sports wagering made it difficult to operate profitably.72
be/273152/#:~:text=The%20web%20of%20laws%20applicable,only%20prohibits%20gambl
ing%2Drelated%20corruption.&text=As%20with%20certain%20televised%20quiz,contrived
%20in%20profit%2Dmaximizing%20ways (providing an overview of the scope of the Sports
Bribery Act).
67. 116 CONG. REC. 503, 588–91 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan); Holden &
Edelman, supra note 23, at 917 (noting passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1970 and the Illegal Gambling Business Act).
68. See 116 CONG. REC. 503, 588–91 (1970); see also Kaitlyn Dunphy, Following Suit with
the Second Circuit: Defining Gambling in the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1295, 1310 (2014) (noting that historically, regulation of gambling has been within the states’
dominion; however, the federal government has sought to involve itself in gambling regulation
when it determined that the states were unable to sufficiently enforce their own laws).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
70. Harris, supra note 13, at 77; Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 918.
71. Harris, supra note 13, at 77. While the transition from Turf Club to sportsbooks
resulted in the closure of the majority of Nevada’s Turf Clubs, the last of such businesses
remained in operation until 1996. Id.
72. Id. at 78. The conventional wisdom has been that bookmakers seek to attract an
equal amount of money on each side of a betting proposition and then make their profit on
the vigorish (a type of commission) on each bet. For instance, in order to win $100, a bettor
would place a wager of $110. If the bettor won, the bettor would receive $200 with the
bookmaker keeping $10. In practice, some bookmakers undoubtedly seek to exploit their
superior knowledge and maximize profits, however, bookmaking as a business is not a high
margin business like some other casino games. See Steven D. Levitt, Why Are Gambling
Markets Organised So Differently from Financial Markets?, 114 ECON. J. 223, 224–26 (2004).
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D. A Shift in Federal Priorities
The 1980s brought about a shift away from prioritizing
gambling-related offenses, and in 1982, Congress lowered the
excise tax for legal operators to 0.25 percent while maintaining the
two percent fee for illegal operators.73 By the 1990s, the lobbying
power of professional sports leagues increased, and there was a
growing concern that a handful of states were considering
legalizing sports betting, including New York and Massachusetts.74
In 1989, the Oregon Lottery had launched a parlay style wagering
game involving NBA games,75 and Congress, along with various
sports organizations, feared that this would be replicated across the
country.76 Initial efforts to amend the Lanham Act as a means of
prohibiting sports betting across the country would stall, however,
and in 1992, Congress succeeded in passing a compromise bill that
froze sports betting as it existed in 1992, rather than banning it.77
Yet the compromise bill, PASPA, created a one-year window which
allowed a jurisdiction that had casino gambling to authorize sports
betting.78 No state took advantage of the exemption, which
effectively confined sports betting to Nevada, with limited forms
taking place in a few other states.79
The passage of PASPA would stop the spread of legal sports
betting, but the rise of the internet and expansion of personal
computing saw illegal sports betting shift from corner bookies and

73. Harris, supra note 13, at 78.
74. Legislation Prohibiting State Lotteries from Misappropriating Professional Sports Service
Marks: Hearing on S. 1772 Before the Subcomm. on Pats., Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dennis
DeConcini); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 919–20.
75. Jeff Manning, Oregon Lottery’s Game Changer: Big-League Sports Betting, OREGON
LIVE (Apr. 22, 2019, 12:53 AM), https://www.oregonlive.com/sports/2019/04/oregonlotterys-game-changer-big-league-sports-betting.html.
76. Hearings, supra note 74, at 1 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini).
77. See John T. Holden, Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on Sports Betting, 35
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 329, 337–51 (2019) (describing the legislative efforts to pass PASPA);
Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 920–21.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3) (1992); the language of the exemption effectively confined it
to a single municipality in the United States, Atlantic City. Holden & Edelman, supra note 23,
at 920.
79. John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. 575, 577 (2020);
Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 920.
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betting by phone to offshore websites.80 The late 1990s through
early 2000s would see the federal government devote significant
attention to targeting online gambling.81 On the last day of
Congress’s 2006 session, it succeeded in passing an internet
gambling bill, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
(UIGEA).82 The passage of UIGEA did not, however, result in a ban
of online gambling; in fact, the bill targeted payment processors.83
Even before passage of the bill, there were concerns about how
many exemptions the bill contained, notably, whether an
exemption for fantasy sports contests and pari-mutuel racing
would defeat the purposes of the bill.84 This exemption for fantasy
sports and the criticism of the exemption would become prophetic
less than a decade later with the rise of daily fantasy sports.85
E. Changing Times Across the Country
As Congress was still attempting to pass internet gambling
legislation, the Justice Department used existing statutes such as
the Wire Act to target online sports betting operations.86 In 2006,
80. See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Future of Internet Gambling, 7 JEFFERY
S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 29, 31 (2000) (noting that the first form of internet gambling was sports
betting, where operators would use the websites to advertise their phone numbers to bettors
who would then call a number to place a wager); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 17–18.
81. See generally John T. Holden, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act and
the Exemption for Fantasy Sports, 28 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 97, 103–12 (2018) (discussing the
legislative history leading up to the passage of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 921.
82. Holden, supra note 81, at 102; see also Brandon P. Rainey, Note, The Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006: Legislative Problems and Solutions, 35 J. LEGIS. 147
(2009) (noting that the UIGEA was a rider to an unrelated port security bill).
83. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–66 (2006).
84. See Internet Gaming: Hearing on S. 692 Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Kevin DiGregory); see also Holden, supra
note 81, at 106 (noting that DiGregory and others believed the exemptions may defeat the
intent of the bill).
85. See John T. Holden & Simon A. Brandon-Lai, Advertised Incentives for Participation
in Daily Fantasy Sports Contests in 2015 and 2016: Legal Classifications and Consumer Implications,
15 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 1, 2–3 (2017) (describing the emergence of daily fantasy sports); see also
Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed Primer in Federal
and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 124–29 (2016) (describing the transition from
fantasy sports to daily fantasy sports and the different genres of daily fantasy sports
contests); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 922–24.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 71 (2001) (noting that Jay Cohen,
owner and operator of the online gambling site World Sports Exchange, was convicted under
the Wire Act); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 24–25.
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federal agents arrested the Chief Executive Officer of online betting
site BetOnSports, David Carruthers.87 In January of 2010,
Carruthers was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison after
pleading guilty to one racketeering conspiracy charge.88 In 2011,
federal authorities, in cooperation with multiple states, unsealed
indictments and seized ten sports gambling websites.89 The day the
indictments were released, Monday, May 23, 2011, would be
known in the online gambling world as Blue Monday.90 But, while
the federal government was taking aim at some of the websites that
illegally offered sports betting to Americans from foreign locales, a
small group of entrepreneurs were developing a new gambling-like
activity that was coined “daily fantasy sports.”91 And despite the
federal enforcement actions against a limited number of offshore
sportsbook operators, there was little impact on the overall size of
the offshore market.92
Daily fantasy sports were a hybrid activity that resembled fantasy
sports in some respect but also appeared to have more elements
associated with gambling.93 Despite the apparent similarities to the
widely prohibited sports gambling, daily fantasy sports appeared,
in some forms, to conform to the exemption for fantasy sports.94
87. Matt Richtel, BetOnSports, After Indictment, Folds Its Hand and Shifts Focus to Asia,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/technology/
11gamble.html.
88. Bloomberg News, Gambling Executive Sentenced to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/09/business/09gamble.html.
89. Ryan M. Rodenberg & Anastasios Kaburakis, Legal and Corruption Issues in Sports
Gambling, 23 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 8, 9 (2013).
90. Id.
91. See John T. Holden, Christopher M. McLeod & Marc Edelman, Regulatory
Categorization and Arbitrage: How Daily Fantasy Sports Companies Navigated Regulatory
Categories Before and After Legalized Gambling, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 113, 129–30 (2020) (noting that
the idea for daily fantasy sports was conceived of by a poker blogger named Kevin Bonnet,
however, others—notably FanDuel and DraftKings—were more successful in launching
commercially successful products); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 922–24.
92. The emergence of the legal betting market has brought with it an interest from
former offshore operators looking to enter the regulated market. For example, the widow of
the former owner of 5Dimes, a Costa Rican-based sportsbook, reached a settlement with the
Department of Justice, and noted plans to apply for licensure in New Jersey. See Matt
Rybaltowski, 5Dimes Transition to Legal U.S. Sports Betting Won’t Be Easy, SPORTS HANDLE
(Oct. 1, 2020), https://sportshandle.com/5dimes-u-s-transition/.
93. See generally Holden et al., supra note 91, at 125–32 (describing the emergence of
the daily fantasy sports industry); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 922–24.
94. The UIGEA exempted fantasy sports contests from the statute that conformed to a
three-pronged exemption in the statute:
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Even with confusion surrounding the legality of daily fantasy
sports and challenges from the New York Attorney General, the
daily fantasy sports industry continued to grow in popularity, and
by 2015, the two major players in the industry—FanDuel and
DraftKings—had attained unicorn status with valuations
exceeding $1 billion each.95 The companies would eventually
transition into two of the most prominent legal sports betting
operators when the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy declared
PASPA unconstitutional.96 Even before FanDuel and DraftKings
captured the attention of Americans looking to bet on sports
outside of Nevada and sowed confusion with lawmakers, some of
the professional sports leagues were experiencing a change of heart
in regard to their long-held opposition to legal sports gambling.97
Adam Silver, Commissioner of the NBA, was the first to advocate
for such change. Silver said, “the laws on sports betting should be
changed. Congress should adopt a federal framework that allows

(ix) participation in any fantasy or simulation sports game or educational game or
contest in which (if the game or contest involves a team or teams) no fantasy or
simulation sports team is based on the current membership of an actual team that
is a member of an amateur or professional sports organization (as those terms are
defined in section 3701 of title 28) and that meets the following conditions:
(I) All prizes and awards offered to winning participants are established and
made known to the participants in advance of the game or contest and their
value is not determined by the number of participants or the amount of any
fees paid by those participants.
(II) All winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the
participants and are determined predominantly by accumulated statistical
results of the performance of individuals (athletes in the case of sports events)
in multiple real-world sporting or other events.
(III) No winning outcome is based—
(aa) on the score, point-spread, or any performance or performances of
any single real-world team or any combination of such teams; or
(bb) solely on any single performance of an individual athlete in any
single real-world sporting or other event.
31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E)(ix) (2018); see also Holden et al., supra note 91, at 128.
95. Julia Greenberg, FanDuel and DraftKings Head to Court as Unicorn Fantasies Falter,
WIRED (Nov. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/fanduel-anddraftkings-head-to-court-as-unicorn-fantasies-falter; Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 923.
96. Holden et al., supra note 91, at 114.
97. See, e.g., Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Gambling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silverlegalize-sports-betting.html (describing the National Basketball Association’s change of
stance in respect to sports wagering).
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states to authorize betting on professional sports, subject to strict
regulatory requirements and technological safeguards.”98
The NBA, however, was not alone. By February of 2015, Major
League Baseball Commissioner Rob Manfred announced that it
was time for the league and owners to give “fresh consideration”
to supporting legalized sports betting.99 The NBA and Major
League Baseball would also be joined by the PGA Tour in support
of a change to the federal ban on sports betting.100 Indeed, the shift
in position of professional sports leagues appeared to mirror
attitudes in society.101 In the sentencing of the founder of one of the
largest illegal sports betting operations in American history, the
judge read from jury notes which stated: “With all the ‘legal’ sports
gambling that goes on in the U.S., coupled with the fact that no one
was physically harmed and nobody was forced to place bets, I see
no threat to society by allowing both . . . to avoid prison time.”102
F. The Supreme Court Opens the Door
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court changed the landscape of
sports betting across the United States, when it struck down PASPA
allowing states to legalize and regulate sports betting for the first

98. Id.
99. David Purdum, MLB to Talk Betting with Owners, ESPN (Feb. 5, 2015),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/12286521/mlb-commissioner-rob-manfredsays-legalized-sports-betting-needs-fresh-consideration.
100. Eric Ramsey, Handicapping Who Is Next in Line to Join NBA, MLB and PGA Tour in
Supporting Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/
19644/joining-nba-mlb-pga-on-sports-betting/.
101. By September 2018 nearly eight in ten Americans supported legal sports betting.
See American Support for Legal Sports Betting, AM. GAMING ASS’N (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.americangaming.org/resources/american-support-for-legal-sports-betting/.
102. John Holden, Breaking Down the Rise and Fall of Legendz Sportsbook, Part II, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32871/legendzsportsbook-sports-betting-2. The case which featured more than a half-dozen defendants
centered on what prosecutors alleged was one of the largest illegal bookmaking operations
in U.S. history. Prosecutors initially speculated that the operation may have handled more
than $1 billion in wagers. However, court documents revealed that this figure may have been
an exaggeration and that the amount was closer to $250 million. The case, which featured
several questionable prosecutorial strategies, resulted in no defendant receiving jail time. Id.;
see also John Holden, Breaking Down the Rise and Fall of Legendz Sportsbook, Part I, LEGAL SPORTS
REP. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32869/legendz-sportsbooksports-betting/.
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time in more than twenty-five years.103 NBA team owner Mark
Cuban speculated that the decision meant that franchises in the
major professional leagues could see their values double,104 and
states lined up looking for a first mover advantage or to plug
budget holes.105 The Supreme Court’s decision struck down
PASPA—though it did leave the door open for Congress to regulate
sports betting directly106—and with the decision, dozens of states
began to explore the possibility of legalizing sports betting within
their borders.107 States took a number of different regulatory
approaches to sports betting, with each state having slightly
different regulations.108
As legal sports betting began to expand across the country,
federal regulators explored the possibility of establishing a
regulatory scheme, but both an initial bill introduced at the end of
Congress’s 2018 session and a subsequent effort gained little
traction.109 The wave of sports betting legalization across the
country has also brought with it the acceptance, if not the
endorsement, of all the major professional sports leagues across the

103. Adam Liptak & Kevin Draper, Supreme Court Ruling Favors Sports Betting, N.Y.
TIMES (May 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/us/politics/supreme-courtsports-betting-newjersey.html#:~:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20The%20Supreme%20Court%20str
uck,that%20Americans%20make%20every%20year; Holden & Edelman supra note 23 at 932–33.
104. Tyler Lauletta, Mark Cuban: The Top Sports Teams Just Saw Their Values Double After
the Supreme Court’s Huge Decision on Sports Betting, BUS. INSIDER (May 14, 2018, 11:16 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/mark-cuban-supreme-court-sports-betting-2018-5.
105. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & John T. Holden, Betting on Education, 81 OHIO ST.
L.J. 465, 475–79 (2020) (describing the states who almost immediately looked to sports betting
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy).
106. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct 1461, 1485–86 (2020)
(“Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is
free to act on its own.”). Justice Thomas, however, did question Congress’s ability to regulate
purely intrastate sports wagering, despite the issue not being before the Court. Id. at 1485
(Thomas, J., concurring); Holden & Edelman, supra note 23, at 932–33.
107. See Becky Harris, Federal Interference with State and Tribal Sports Betting Regulations
Will Not Work: Where the Sports Wagering Integrity Act of 2018 Went Wrong and How Federal
Legislation Might Be Effective, 30 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 106, 109–10 (2020) (describing the
states that acted quickly to legalize sports betting).
108. See, e.g., Holden, supra note 79, at 596–609 (describing the varied approaches that
states have taken to regulate sports betting).
109. Anthony Cabot & Keith Miller, Moving Faster Than the Speed of Regulation: Can StateAuthorized Sports Wagering Dodge a Game-Fixing Bullet Without the Help of the Feds?, 30 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 85, 102–04 (2020) (describing the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act).
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United States.110 However, one major sports organization has
remained steadfast in its opposition to sports betting expansion—
the NCAA.111
The NCAA is, in fact, the facilitator of one of the most wagered
on events on an annual basis.112 The NCAA’s connection to
gambling is inseparable, and with the rise of the legal market, that
connection is likely to grow even stronger.113 From the perspective
of protecting integrity, the NCAA should embrace the rise of legal
sports gambling, as regulators, sports bettors, sportsbook
operators, and sports organizations all share a common interest in
preventing sporting events and athletes from being corrupted.114
II. COLLEGIATE SPORTS AND MATCH-FIXING
The NCAA’s hesitation to embrace legal gambling is driven in
large part because of the organization’s long history of seeing teams

110. See Charles Watson, NFL, NBA and MLB Come Around to Sports Betting as Leagues
Could Win Big, FOX NEWS (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/sports/sports-leaguescautiously-coming-around-to-sports-betting-as-financial-picture-comes-into-focus
(describing the expected benefits that leagues would see with legal sports betting).
111. See NCAA Examining Impact of Sports Wagering, NCAA (July 19, 2018),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-examining-impactsports-wagering (NCAA Chief Legal Officer Donald Remy stated: “While we certainly
respect the Supreme Court’s decision, our position on sports wagering remains.”).
The NCAA’s position, is, of course, opposed to any gambling. See John Chick, NCAA
Remains Opposed to Legalized Gambling; Some Schools Want a Cut, SCORE,
https://www.thescore.com/ncaab/news/1573365 (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
112. See Hilary Russ, Americans to Bet $8.5 Billion on NCAA’s ‘March Madness’ Basketball
Tournament: Report, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-basketball-ncaa-gambling/americans-to-bet-8-5-billion-on-ncaas-marchmadness-basketball-tournament-report-idUSKCN1QZ0YH (noting Americans were
expected to wager $8.5 billion on the 2019 Men’s collegiate basketball tournament). The
NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship Tournament has been associated with a $13.3 billion
loss in productivity in addition to the amount wagered on the event. Thomas Barrabi, NCAA
March Madness to Cost Employers $13.3B in Lost Productivity, Firm Says, FOX BUS. (Mar. 21,
2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/ncaa-march-madness-to-cost-employers13-3b-in-lost-productivity-firm-says.
113. Ben Nuckols, NCAA Can’t Keep Tournament Games Away from Legal Gambling,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/ncaa-cant-keeptournament-games-away-from-legalgambling/#:~:text=But%20it%20won’t%20be,to%20become%20fewer%20and%20fewer.
114. Martin Rogers & Kim Hjelmgaard, What the U.S. Can Learn About Legalized Sports
Betting from the U.K., USA TODAY (June 6, 2018, 8:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/2018/06/06/sports-betting-what-u-s-can-learn-legalization-u-k/664382002.
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and players victimized by match-fixers.115 Indeed, the NCAA has
been plagued by more match-fixing scandals than other American
leagues, perhaps, because of the fact that NCAA athletes only
receive compensation in the form of tuition scholarships and
meager stipends that are meant to cover only the most basic of
expenses, in theory making the practice of bribing a collegiate
athlete more cost effective than attempting to induce a millionaire
professional athlete to throw a game.116 A healthy fear of
match-fixing is something that all sport organizations should have,
as fixes have affected all levels of sport. But the legal betting market
has long served as the proverbial canary in the coal mine for
detecting match-fixing, and because of the added liquidity in a
broad legal market, integrity of both the legal betting markets and
the underlying sporting events should be improved rather
than diminished.117
A. What is Match-Fixing?
Match-fixing has been defined as an effort “to deliberately
distort the outcome of a sporting contest (or an element within the
contest) for the personal material gain of one or more parties.”118
Researchers Ian Preston and Stefan Szymanski noted that
“individual contestants may be willing to reduce their effort
contribution for specific matches if the rewards for doing so are
large enough.”119 Match-fixing can take place for a variety of
reasons, including one team values a victory more than another, or
“there is an opportunity to generate returns on insider
information,” most commonly through exploiting an information
115. See, e.g., A Look at Some Notable US Game-Fixing Scandals, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept.
17, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/203c6e115d464363b4d39c6a4451bf1d.
116. See John Holden, Match Fixers Have More Tools to Manipulate Sports Betting Outcomes
than Just Bribery, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 6, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/
20984/match-fixing-primer-part-ii (explaining why the belief that professional athletes are
protected by their high salaries may be misguided).
117. See Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime Terrorism, Homeland Sec. & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. 1–2 (2018) (statement of Becky Harris, Chair, Nevada Gaming Control Board)
(detailing Nevada’s history of detecting fixed games); see also Holden, supra note 79, at 597–
98 (describing Harris’s testimony).
118. Mike Huggins, Match-Fixing: A Historical Perspective, 35 INT’L J. HIST. SPORT 123,
124 (2018).
119. Ian Preston & Stefan Szymanski, Cheating in Contests, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y
612, 613 (2003).
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inefficiency in a gambling market.120 Common scenarios where
match-fixing occurs include a variety of situations: firstly, where
players are influenced to perform sub-optimally for economic
benefits, secondly, where a referee is influenced to favor or punish
one team or another, and thirdly, where tournament structures
create perverse incentives.121
Match-fixing comes in a variety of typologies.122 The most
obvious type of fix would be a team or player intentionally losing a
match, like the heavily favored 1919 Chicago White Sox team. But
in reality, match-fixing happens in many different ways, with some
not even seeing a team need to lose the game to accomplish a fixer’s
objective.123 One type of fix that has often been associated with
corruption in NCAA basketball is point-shaving.124 Point-shaving
occurs when a gambler convinces a player, or players, to reduce
their effort such that their team wins by less than the bookmakers’
point-spread.125 As bookmakers establish point-spreads based on
the idea that players will play at maximum available effort, even a
marginal diminishment in effort can result in a sufficient reduction

120. Id.
121. John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Lone-Wolf Match-Fixing: Global Policy
Considerations, 9 INT’L J. SPORT POL’Y & POL. 137, 138 (2017); see also Preston & Szymanski,
supra note 119, at 617–18 (2003). Preston & Szymanski highlight a 1994 soccer match that took
place as part of the Shell Caribbean Cup as evidence of a tournament structure creating a
problematic scenario. In the event, Barbados and Grenada faced off, with Barbados needing
to win the match by at least two goals to advance to the final. Any other result and Granada
would advance instead. Tournament rules said that if a match went to sudden death
overtime the first team to score would be declared the winner by two goals. In the 83rd
minute, Granada scored a goal, making the score 2-1. Unlikely to score another goal to secure
a two-goal lead, Barbados players scored on their own goal to send the game to overtime,
the final minutes of regulation time were spent with Barbados defending both goals, as a
goal either way would result in Granada advancing. Id.
122. See John Holden, Match-Fixing and Other Manipulations in Sports Betting: A Primer,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 4, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20922/match-fixingprimer-sports-betting/.
123. See id. (noting that fixes that involve point-shaving because the team only needs to
win by less than the established point-spread—something which may be psychologically
relieving to a player who does not want to let teammates down by losing a game outright).
124. See, e.g., David Purdum, ‘The Worst Fix Ever’, ESPN (Oct. 3, 2014),
https://www.espn.com/espn/chalk/story/_/id/11633538/betting-chronicling-worst-fixever-1978-79-bc-point-shaving-scandal (describing the point-shaving scheme perpetrated by
members of the Boston College men’s basketball team in the 1978–1979 season).
125. Justin Wolfers, Point Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
279, 279–80 (2006).
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to win by less than the established point-spread.126 A related type
of fix, which can occasionally be sold to athletes as unproblematic,
is spot-fixing, where the fix involves a manipulation of an aspect
within a contest that need not affect the end result.127 Spot-fixing
can be lucrative for fixers because of the existence of prop bets,
which are discrete wagers placed on events within the contest,
other than final score of the game.128 Finally, tanking is a means of
playing to a sub-maximal effort either because a contest is
meaningless, or a future benefit could be gained.129 Commonly,
teams have been incentivized in professional sports to tank in order
to receive a higher draft pick, but tanking could conceivably occur
in college sports by fielding an inferior team if playoff seeding were
already established.130

126. Id.
127. Holden, supra note 122. Spot-fixing is like match-fixing except it only involves
manipulating one aspect of the game. The manipulation may have little impact on the overall
result of the game. One contemporary example of spot-fixing occurred when the fifth-tier
English soccer team Sutton United played Premier League team Arsenal. Sutton United’s
goalie had attracted attention because of his atypical soccer physique, as a result the
bookmaker Sun Bets offered wagers on whether the goalie would eat a pie. Learning of the
unique proposition, the goalie began eating a pie on the sidelines during the 83rd minute of
the game. The incident, obviously, had no impact on the result of the game, but was
significant for bettors and bookmakers. See Victor Mather, Goalie Eats Pie and Loses His Job,
While Bettors’ Wallets Fatten, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/21/sports/soccer/wayne-shaw-sutton-soccer-pie.html.
128. See What Is a Prop Bet?, LINES, https://www.thelines.com/betting/prop-bets/
(last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (noting that prop bets in the United States became popular in
association with the Super Bowl, and can include things such as the result of the coin toss or
the length of the rendition of the national anthem).
129. Mark Deeks, What Actually Is Tanking, and Which NBA Teams Actually Do It?, SB
NATION (Jan. 10, 2014, 10:52 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/2014/1/10/5266770/nbadraft-lottery-tanking-gm.
130. One of the more infamous alleged tanking campaigns was dubbed “suck for
Luck.” Three NFL teams purportedly sought to finish with the worst record in order to be
able to draft Stanford University quarterback Andrew Luck. Bill Barnwell, Breaking Down the
Suck for Luck Campaign, GRANTLAND (Nov. 7, 2011), https://grantland.com/features/
breaking-suck-luck-campaign/. In college sports tanking could occur for a college football
team that is unlikely to reach six wins, and therefore qualify for a bowl game, as a result of
requiring six wins to advance many teams end up playing, effectively, meaningless games
at the end of the season. These games could be targeted by match-fixers. See Eddie Timanus
& Paul Myerberg, Get Ready Teams with Losing Records in Bowl Games After NCAA Waives Win
Requirement, USA TODAY (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:04 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/ncaaf/2020/10/14/ncaa-waives-college-football-bowl-win-eligibility-requirement/
3656916001/ (noting that the NCAA waived their typical requirements for bowl eligibility in
2020 in light of the coronavirus pandemic and teams playing differing numbers of games).
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B. Why Does Match-Fixing Happen?
While tournament structures may be one scenario that can lead
players or teams to engage in sub-optimal performance, or even
cause match-fixers to target those games, there are some factors that
can make match-fixing more likely to occur.131 Professor Declan
Hill, one of the foremost experts on match-fixing, has argued that
three conditions lead to some leagues seeing more match-fixing
than others: illegal gambling networks; expectations of corruption,
or a distrust in the league; and poorly paid players.132 While the
major American professional sports leagues compensate their
players handsomely, collegiate athletes remain unpaid absent
scholarships and stipends covering the cost of attendance.133 Recent
changes allowing athletes to monetize their name, image, and
likeness (NIL) will provide some college athletes with additional
sources of revenue. But those athletes able to earn a living on NIL
deals are likely to be in the minority.134 Despite growing
legalization of sports gambling in the United States, the illegal
gambling market remains dominant.135 The second criteria
regarding the presence of a view that leagues are corrupt is likely
questionable, though there have been criticisms leveled at the
NCAA over what some view as a hypocritical system, which sees
athletes generate billions in revenue, while effectively receiving
only a scholarship as compensation.136
131. Holden, supra note 122.
132. Declan Hill, A Critical Mass of Corruption: Why Some Football Leagues Have More
Match-Fixing than Others, 11 INT’L J. SPORTS MKTG. & SPONSORSHIP 221, 225–29 (2010).
133. See Holden, supra note 122 (noting that the NCAA does not allow for
“compensation beyond tuition and grants in aid”).
134. See Dan Murphy, Higher Earning, ESPN, https://www.espn.com/
espn/feature/story/_/id/29388424/how-much-money-college-athletes-make-nil-rights
(last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (describing the variance in expected NIL earnings).
135. See Andrew J. Silver, Legal Sports Betting Still Faces Competition from Illegal
Market: Low State Taxes Could Turn the Tide, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2020, 9:02 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewjsilver/2020/04/07/legal-sports-betting-still-facescompetition-from-illegal-market-low-state-taxes-could-turn-the-tide/?sh=15c40ab223e3
(noting that some of the tax policies and rates in states that legalized sports betting following
the Murphy decision may make it difficult for operators to offer pricing that is competitive
with the illegal market).
136. Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 35, at 466 (discussing criticism of how major
American sports leagues have handled certain high-profile situations); see also Holden, supra
note 122. Hill notes that collapsed leagues are those “where there is a widespread public
perception that the sport is not a competition, but effectively a theatrical exercise[,]” and “this
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While much of the discussion on match-fixing has historically
centered on bribery, in reality, match-fixers typically employ a
variety of different tactics to accomplish their goals, particularly if
one approach proves ineffective.137 Bribery is often used to induce
players to fix matches, but match-fixers have also been known
to use threats of extortion or blackmail to accomplish their
objectives.138 In some instances, such as when a player is
dissatisfied with his or her organization, a game can be impacted
without a third-party’s influence.139 Regardless of the motivations,
match-fixing threatens the integrity of not only the underlying
sport, but of the betting markets that operate on the assumption
that the games are being played by competitors exerting a good
faith effort.140
C. History of Prominent Collegiate Match-Fixing Scandals
Match-fixing has affected nearly every major sport at some
point in time, and collegiate sports have seemingly been
disproportionately targeted in the United States.141 Former
Marquette University Sports Law Review editor Ante Udovicic
chronicled thirty gambling-related incidents between 1945 and
1998 involving collegiate sports, with many involving allegations
of match-fixing.142 Collegiate match-fixing scandals date back to at
least 1945, when two Brooklyn College players accepted $1,000 to
throw a game against the University of Akron.143 In 1951, the
college basketball world was shocked when the New York District
Attorney indicted players from four New York schools.144 Caught
up in the sweep was the defending champion of both the NCAA
public perception is marked by a significant (over 40%) decline in attendance . . . ” as well as
a loss of sponsorship and a reorganizing of league management. See Hill, supra note 132,
at 225.
137. Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 35, at 464.
138. Id. at 465.
139. See Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 121, at 138 (describing the typology of matchfixing referred to as lone-wolf match-fixing).
140. See, e.g., id. at 141 (discussing different rationales for match-fixing).
141. See Udovicic, supra note 11, at 424–27.
142. See id.
143. Joe Goldstein, Rumblings: The Brooklyn Five, ESPN (Nov. 19, 2003),
https://www.espn.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_rumblings.html.
144. Joe Goldstein, Explosion: 1951 Scandals Threaten College Hoops, ESPN (Nov. 19,
2003), https://www.espn.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_explosion.html.
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men’s basketball tournament and National Invitation Tournament,
City College of New York.145 The 1951 scandal, however, was not
confined to New York. In fact the University of Kentucky, a team
once called “untouchable,” was suspended for the entirety of the
1952–53 season because of the alleged involvement in the pointshaving scheme.146 In 1961, Philadelphia’s St. Joseph’s University
was accused of fixing several games during the season, despite
playing in the NCAA’s third-place game that season.147 The year
1961 also saw dozens of individuals arrested in connection with a
match-fixing ring orchestrated by disgraced NBA player and
referee Jack Molinas.148
The 1970s were largely quiet with regard to high profile
scandals involving match-fixing coming to light.149 That was,
however, until it was revealed that the Boston College men’s
basketball team had been implicated in a point-shaving scheme in
1978–79.150 In a scheme orchestrated by organized crime figure
Henry Hill, who was later the inspiration for Ray Liotta’s character
in the 1990 film Goodfellas, several Boston College players shaved
points at Hill’s request.151 Boston College, however, proved
somewhat inept at controlling the score of the games.152 In 1985, a
Tulane University student approached a player on the basketball
team, who he had previously provided with cocaine, with an idea
to shave points against Southern Miss.153 The Tulane student paid
five members of the team between $400 and $900 for the fix and
wagered $7,000 across various bookmakers.154 Certain games
during the 1985 season involving Memphis State University were
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Patrick Sauer, A Forgotten Classic and the Complicated Legacy of the 1961 St. Joe’s
Hawks, VICE (Apr. 4, 2016, 10:28 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/wnm58m/aforgotten-classic-and-the-complicated-legacy-of-the-1961-st-joes-hawks.
148. The Molinas scandal saw thirty-seven players from twenty-two different colleges
arrested in connection with the incident. See Joe Goldstein, Explosion II: The Molinas Period, ESPN
(Nov. 19, 2003), https://www.espn.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_molinas.html.
149. Udovicic, supra note 11, at 424–25.
150. Purdum, supra note 124.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Lenny Vangilder, A Sad Anniversary: 25 Years Since Tulane Basketball’s Point Shaving
Scandal, CRESCENT CITY SPORTS (Mar. 26, 2010), https://crescentcitysports.com/a-sadanniversary-25-years-since-tulane-basketballs-point-shaving-scandal/.
154. Id.
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also called into question when allegations involving point-shaving
came out in grand jury testimony investigating a gambling
operation in the Memphis area; however, the allegations were
never substantiated.155
In 1996, thirteen Boston College University football players
were suspended for placing sports bets.156 While the Middlesex,
Massachusetts District Attorney found no evidence of
point-shaving, two of the players were reported to have bet against
their own team.157 The 1990s also saw an alleged conspiracy
involving members of the Fresno State men’s basketball team,
when one informant reported two members had received between
$1,000 and $2,000 in jewelry for shaving points.158 The same year, it
was revealed Stevin Smith, an Arizona State University point
guard, shaved points after becoming indebted more than $10,000 to
a campus bookie.159 In 1998, two former Northwestern University
basketball players were indicted on charges related to a
point-shaving scheme in 1995.160
In 2006, a point-shaving scheme involving the University of
Toledo Rockets was detected by Nevada odds-makers after
observing unexplained betting patterns.161 The point-shaving
scheme that was executed between 2004–2006 involved at least six
players, three from the football team and three from the men’s
basketball team, and two Detroit-area business men.162 In 2011, the
155. SI Staff, Troubled Times at Memphis State, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 24, 1985),
https://vault.si.com/vault/1985/06/24/troubled-times-at-memphis-state.
156. Malcolm Moran, Boston College Bans 13 Football Players Over Bets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
7, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/07/sports/boston-college-bans-13-footballplayers-over-bets.html.
157. Id.
158. Mark Arax, Fresno Reels Amid Probe of Point-Shaving Allegations, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
27, 1997, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-03-27-mn-42668story.html.
159. Stevin (Hedake) Smith, Confessions of a Point Shaver Former Arizona State Star Hedake
Smith Reveals How He and His Accomplices Fixed Basketball Games, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov.
9, 1998), https://vault.si.com/vault/1998/11/09/confessions-of-a-point-shaver-formerarizona-state-star-hedake-smith-reveals-how-he-and-his-accomplices-fixed-basketballgames.
160. Pam Belluck, College Basketball; Ex-Northwestern Players Charged in Point-Shaving,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/27/sports/collegebasketball-ex-northwestern-players-charged-in-point-shaving.html.
161. Harris, supra note 13, at 85.
162. Mike Fish, Six Ex-players Charged with Conspiracy, ESPN (May 6, 2009),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/news/story?id=4146980.
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FBI conducted an investigation into the University of San Diego’s
men’s basketball team concluding that between five and six games
had been fixed.163 The University of San Diego scheme involved a
former assistant coach bringing a player into the conspiracy and
inducing him to shave points for $1,000. Two years later, former
Auburn University basketball star Varez Ward was indicted on
conspiracy to commit a violation of the Sports Bribery Act.164 The
Grand Jury indictment alleged that Ward sought to conspire to
commit sports bribery.165 However, after entering into a pretrial
diversion program the indictment was dismissed on February 13,
2015.166 In a scheme similar to that at Arizona State University, a
University of Texas El Paso student and campus bookie tried to
corrupt college basketball games taking advantage of relationships
he had with players on the men’s basketball team.167 The scheme
was uncovered after a team coach alerted authorities when learning
that team members had been betting on sports with the campus
bookie.168 In the ranks of professional sports National Hockey
League (NHL) player Evander Kane was accused of betting on his
own games by his wife in an Instagram post.169 While it is
undoubtedly true that many match-fixing schemes are
unsuccessful, any level of corruption threatens to undermine trust
in a sports organization, which can have disastrous commercial
consequences for an organization and life changing consequences
for an athlete who finds themselves caught up in a scheme.170

163. Harris, supra note 13, at 86.
164. Alex Kay, Former Auburn Player Varez Ward Indicted in Point-Shaving Scandal,
BLEACHER REP. (June 4, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1661262-former-auburnplayer-varez-ward-indicted-in-point-shaving-scandal?m=0.
165. Indictment, United States v. Ward, No. 2:13-cr-00089 (M.D. Ala. May 30, 2013).
166. Id.
167. Aaron Martinez, Bookie in UTEP Betting Scandal Pleads Guilty, EL PASO TIMES (Oct.
21, 2016, 12:11 PM), https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/crime/2016/10/21/
bookie-utep-betting-scandal-pleads-guilty/92487014.
168. Id.
169. ESPN News Services, NHL to Investigate Allegation that San Jose Shark’s Evander Kane
Bet on His Own Games, ESPN (July 31, 2021), https://www.espn.com/
nhl/story/_/id/31929787/nhl-investigate-allegation-san-jose-sharks-evander-kane-betown-games.
170. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2014) (noting that the Sports Bribery Act carries with
it fines and up to five years in prison); see also Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 35, at
461 (discussing how the commercial viability of sports is tied to the idea of “uncertainty
of outcome”).
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TABLE 1: POINT-SHAVING PAYMENTS IN COLLEGIATE
SPORTS 1945–2012
Year
1945

Team Fixing
Brooklyn College

1949–50

Manhattan College

1949
1961
1978–79
1985

University of Kentucky
St. Joseph’s University
Boston College
Tulane University
Arizona State
University
Northwestern
University

1994
1995
1997

Fresno State University

2004–06
2009–10
2012

University of Toledo
University of San Diego
Auburn University

Amount Paid
$1,000171
$50 per week off-season and
$3,000 in association with three
specific games at MSG172
$500173
$2,750174
$1,000 and $500175
$400 to $900176
$10,000 in debt forgiveness and
$10,000177
$4,000178
Jewelry and $1,000 to $2,000
payments179
At least $500180
$1,000181
N/A

171. Joe Goldstein, Rumblings: The Brooklyn Five, ESPN (Nov. 19, 2003),
https://www.espn.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_rumblings.html.
172. Joe Goldstein, Explosion: 1951 Scandals Threaten College Hoops, ESPN (Nov. 19,
2003), https://www.espn.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_explosion.html (discussing
point shaving at Madison Square Garden (MSG)).
173. Id.
174. Patrick Sauer, A Forgotten Classic and the Complicated Legacy of the 1961 St. Joe’s
Hawks, VICE (Apr. 4, 2016, 10:28 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/wnm58m/aforgotten-classic-and-the-complicated-legacy-of-the-1961-st-joes-hawks.
175. Purdum, supra note 124.
176. Vangilder, supra note 153.
177. Smith, supra note 159.
178. Belluck, supra note 160.
179. The fixing involving Fresno State University players is only alleged. Arax, supra
note 158.
180. Fish, supra note 162.
181. Shaun Assael, Portrait of a Point Shaver, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2014),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/10545391/former-assistant-tjbrown-brandon-johnson-center-university-san-diego-point-shaving-scandal-espn-magazine.
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D. Why Are College Athletes Disproportionately Targeted?
Why college athletes are disproportionately the perpetrators of
American match-fixing schemes is likely the result of a combination
of factors.182 There remains a great deal of debate in academic
circles over the prevalence of point-shaving, particularly in college
basketball.183 However, there are several observable trends that
may indicate why college athletes appear more susceptible; firstly,
the fact that college athletes are unpaid, beyond scholarships,
grants in aid, and money they receive for their NIL rights, may
mean that athletes, particularly those in need of money, can be
induced economically to alter their performance.184 Secondly, the
absence of direct payment may create a situation whereby a college
athlete in need of money is willing to engage in a prohibited act in
order to satisfy that need.185 Thirdly, student-athletes interact
frequently with other students on campus in a way that
professional athletes typically do not. This may make athletes more
vulnerable to match-fixers’ advances.186 In contrast to many
professional athletes, who are often isolated from the general
public, beyond when they choose to be out in public, college
athletes are like other students and have to attend classes and
interact with non-athletes frequently.187 Fourthly, as most students
who play college sports will never play professionally, a
match-fixer may be able to induce a college athlete to fix a game,
such as offering money where money would otherwise not be
182. See generally Udovicic, supra note 11, at 424–27 (detailing collegiate gambling scandals).
183. See Wolfers, supra note 125; cf. Jesse Gregory, Do Basketball Scoring Patterns Reflect
Illegal Point Shaving or Optimal In-Game Adjustments?, 9 QUANTITATIVE ECON. 1053 (2018);
Richard Borghesi, Widespread Corruption in Sports Gambling: Fact or Fiction?, 74 S. ECON. J.
1063 (2008).
184. See supra Table 1.
185. See generally Holden, supra note 122 (describing circumstances that can lead to
match-fixing incidents).
186. For instance, NCAA rules require that athlete dormitories have at least fifty-one
percent of the students living in there from the general student population. See Anita Moran,
Building Campus Housing with Student-Athletes in Mind, ATHLETIC BUS. (Dec. 2016),
https://www.athleticbusiness.com/fitness-training/building-campus-housing-with-studentathletes-in-mind.html#:~:text=NCAA%20rules%20require%20that%20residence,%22special
%20treatment%22%20to%20athletes.
187. See Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/
about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa (last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (“The association’s
belief in student-athletes as students first is a foundational principle. As such, college-bound
and continuing student-athletes must meet academic standards to participate in NCAA sports.”).
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available.188 Finally, another factor that has likely led to student
athletes being targeted is that a number of athletes who historically
engaged in point-shaving schemes were indebted to bookmakers
themselves, and the harsh penalties associated with gambling
amongst NCAA athletes may create perverse incentives to not
come forward for fear that they may lose the ability to ever play
their sport again and risk losing their scholarships.189 The
vulnerabilities facing college sports far exceed those facing the
major American professional sports, and because of this, the NCAA
must be proactive in providing a system that encourages student
athletes to seek assistance before games are fixed.
The reality facing the NCAA is that they are engaged in an
uphill battle against two fronts. On the one side there is a massive
growth of legal sports betting taking place, and on the other side
there has been a significant shift in societal and judicial attitudes
toward gambling more broadly.190 The NCAA has two choices:
move forward to modernize their education programs to protect
student athletes and the integrity of college sports, or retreat as if it
is immune from the threat of legal gambling.191 But, as Gary
Bettman, Commissioner of the NHL, succinctly described his
embrace of legalized sports wagering, “In this day and age, you
either evolve or become extinct.”192

188. The NCAA estimates that just two percent of collegiate athletes will go on to play
professionally. See NCAA Recruiting Facts, NCAA (Aug. 2014), https://www.nfhs.org/
media/886012/recruiting-fact-sheet-web.pdf.
189. One potential solution to this would be to implement whistleblower protections
for student-athletes so that they do not fear retribution from the NCAA or their school. See
also Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 35, at 471.
190. See, e.g., Holden, supra note 102 (discussing the apprehension of sentencing an
illegal gambling operator to jail when gambling is now ubiquitous).
191. See Andrew Maykuth, What Are the Odds? Colleges Fear Sports Betting Will Lead to
Cheating, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/
college-sports-betting-ncaa-laws-pennsylvania-new-jersey-20180914.html (describing fears
surrounding legal sports betting).
192. Greg Wyshynski & David Purdum, Evander Kane Betting Allegations: What We Know
and What We Don’t, ESPN (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/id/
31944608/evander-kane-betting-allegations-know.
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III. IGNORING THE REALITIES OF LEGAL REGULATED SPORTS
BETTING IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE
The dismantling of the prohibition placed upon states wishing
to legalize sports wagering began in 2011 when New Jersey voters
approved a non-binding referendum allowing for legal sports
wagering,193 and culminated on May 14, 2018, when the Supreme
Court ruled in Murphy that parts of the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act of 1992 were unconstitutional.194
From May 13, 2018, to the present, legal regulated sports betting
has grown beyond Nevada with twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia accepting legal wagers.195 Three additional states have
legalized sports betting196 and are in the process of establishing
sports wagering regulations. Meanwhile an additional two states197
are considering sports betting legalization legislation and voters in
both California and Florida may have the chance to determine the
future of wagering via a 2022 ballot measure.198
A. Regulatory Structures
While the regulatory structure varies from state to state,
regulatory policy for sports wagers generally falls into five categories.
1. States with prohibitions on collegiate athletics generally
Only Oregon has a total prohibition on wagering on college
sports.199 However, Oregon appears to be willing to at least

193. David Porter, Pro Leagues File to Stop New Jersey Sports Betting, YAHOO! SPORTS
(Sept. 29, 2014), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/pro-leagues-file-stop-jersey-sportsbetting-233606648—spt.html; Adam Kilgore, For Sports Leagues, Legalized Sports Betting Offers
New
Risks,
and
Massive
Rewards,
WASH.
POST
(May
14,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/for-sports-leagues-legalized-sports-betting-offersnew-risks-and-massive-rewards/2018/05/14/5ce4caf4-5790-11e8-858f-12becb4d6067_story.html.
194. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1483–84 (2018).
195. Interactive Map: Sports Betting in the U.S., AM. GAMING ASS’N,
https://www.americangaming.org/research/state-gaming-map/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
196. Id.
197. Massachusetts and Ohio. Id.
198. Ryan Byrne, Sports Betting Initiative Qualifies for 2022 Ballot in California,
BALLOTPEDIA NEWS (May 28, 2021, 1:23 PM), https://news.ballotpedia.org/2021/
05/28/sports-betting-initiative-qualifies-for-2022-ballot-in-california.
199. See College Football Betting 2021, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://
www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting/ncaaf/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
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consider the possibility of allowing wagering on collegiate athletic
events in the future.200 According to the Oregon Lottery’s Most
Asked Questions, offering action on college sports does not make
sense for Oregon at this time.201
2. States with prohibitions on collegiate athletics for home-state schools
The Delaware Lottery allows its operators to offer bets on
collegiate sporting events, with the exception of games involving
Delaware colleges, universities, or teams.202 Delaware racinos,
however, do not accept single game wagers on any college
games.203
New Hampshire defines a “prohibited sports event” upon
which bets cannot be offered as any collegiate sport or athletic event
that takes place in New Hampshire or games involving a New
Hampshire college team.204 Legal sports wagers can be offered on
games that are part of a college sports tournament, even if a New
Hampshire college team participates.205
New Jersey’s state constitutional referendum from 2011
provides that wagers including any collegiate sport or athletic
event that takes place in New Jersey or games involving a New
Jersey college team are “prohibited sports event[s]” upon which
wagers cannot be offered.206 Bets can be offered on games taking
place as a series within a college sports tournament in which a New
Jersey college team participates but not on New Jersey teams.207
Perhaps after experiencing some buyer’s remorse for the
limitations placed upon collegiate sports betting, New Jersey
lawmakers amended a bill on November 9, 2020 to allow for a
public referendum to expand wagering on all college sports,

200. Most Asked Questions, OREGON LOTTERY SCORE BOARD, https://sports.oregonlottery.org/
most-asked-questions (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
201. Id.
202. 10-200-204 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 204-2.0 (2019).
203. Delaware Sports Betting Information—Sportsbooks, Betting Sites, SPORTS HANDLE,
https://sportshandle.com/delaware (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
204. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Lot 3002.06 (2020).
205. Id.
206. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69N-1.1 (2019); New Jersey Sports Betting Amendment, Public
Question 1 (2011), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Sports_Betting_
Amendment,_Public_Question_1_(2011) (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
207. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69N-1.1.
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including New Jersey team play both inside and outside the state.208
While the referendum as originally contemplated would have
expanded sports wagering offerings throughout the state, it was
much more modest in scope than the referendum that will be
placed before voters in November 2021.209 After lawmakers
received the approval of “the NCAA and the Attorney General’s
Office and a lot of the teams . . . ,” they decided to add a provision
to allow for sports wagering on New Jersey’s teams regular season
collegiate games.210 Additional revenues that would flow to the
state budget by expanding sports wagering offerings was also
a consideration.211
In New York, wagers on any collegiate sport or athletic event
that takes place within the state or sport or athletic events in which
any New York college team participates (regardless of location) are
prohibited.212 Tournament play is the only exception, and this is
only allowed if no New York teams are participating. All wagers
on collegiate sports events must be approved by the New York
State Gaming Commission.213
The Rhode Island Lottery allows wagers to be offered on
collegiate sporting events, with the exception of “collegiate sports
contests or collegiate athletic events that take place in Rhode Island
or a sports contest or athletic event in which any Rhode Island
college team participates regardless of where the event takes place.” 214
Virginia’s allowance for wagering on collegiate sports is
exclusive of the inclusion of teams from “a Virginia public or
private institution of higher education.”215 The state law also states:
“No person shall place or accept a bet on Virginia college sports.”216
208. Wayne Parry, NJ Vote Would Allow Sports Betting on All College Games, AP NEWS
(Nov. 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-college-football-sports-constitutionsnew-jersey-6ebc8e81e489f21e5a21c96de34ad6ad.
209. Ryan Byrne, New Jersey Voters Will Decide Amendment to Allow College Sports Betting
on In-State Games, New Jersey-Based Teams, CTR. SQUARE (June 29, 2021) https://
www.thecentersquare.com/new_jersey/new-jersey-voters-will-decide-amendment-to-allowcollege-sports-betting-on-in-state-games/article_ab2d22c6-d8ff-11eb-97b6-5fbb3fa3cef4.html.
210. Parry, supra note 208.
211. Id.
212. N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1367(1)(s) (McKinney 2020); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5329.13 (2019).
213. Id.
214. 42-61.2 R.I. CODE R. § 1(28) (LexisNexis 2020).
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4030 (2020).
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4039.
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The prohibition does not prevent betting on games in a tournament
or multigame event in which a Virginia college sports team
participates, so long as a Virginia college team is not playing in
the game for which wagers are offered.217
The District of Columbia (D.C.) prohibits wagers from being
accepted on any collegiate sports or athletic event in which any
D.C.-based collegiate or university team participates regardless of
where the event takes place.218 Bets are allowed on the games of a
college sports tournament in which a D.C. college team participates.219
3. States with prohibitions on proposition bets for collegiate sporting
events
Colorado does not allow for prop bets on collegiate events,220
Virginia has a similar prohibition,221 and Indiana prohibits wagers
on in-play collegiate player prop bets.222 Additionally, Indiana
prohibits bets on any sporting events that have not been approved
for wagering by the state’s gaming commission.223 Wagering in
Indiana on collegiate events is limited to NCAA Division I sports.224
Tennessee specifically prohibits in-game proposition bets on
the performance or non-performance of a team or individual
participant during a collegiate sporting event.225
4. States prohibiting wagers on home-state collegiate sports proposition bets
Illinois prohibits wagers on a sports event involving an Illinois
collegiate team or individual competing through an Illinois
collegiate program.226 Combination wagers determined by the
performance of an Illinois participant, including parlay bets and
fantasy sports in which individuals are competing through an
217. H.B. 896, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
218. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 30, § 2127.1–27.2 (2019).
219. Id.
220. COLO. CODE REGS. § 207-2:1.3(3) (2020).
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4039.
222. Ind. Gaming Comm’n Dir. on Betting Catalogues, Wagers and Other Events 1 (Jan.
22, 2020) [hereinafter Ind. Gaming Comm’n].
223. 4 IND. ADMIN. CODE 38-5-4 (2020).
224. Ind. Gaming Comm’n, supra note 222, at 1.
225. Rules and Regulations, Chapter 15—Sports Gaming License Rules, Regulations and
Standards, §§ 15.1.3(I)((2), 15.1.10(B)(1) (Apr. 15, 2020). TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-301 (2020).
226. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 1900.1120(b)–(c) (2020).
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Illinois collegiate program, are also prohibited.227 Wagers may be
placed on tournaments or season outcomes if the wager does not
involve an Illinois participant.228
Iowa and Virginia also prohibit proposition bets involving instate college teams.229
As of the writing of this Article, it would seem as if the NCAA
has been mildly successful in promoting its perspective on the
prohibition of wagers on home-state collegiate athletics and
proposition bets. Of the jurisdictions with legal regulated sports
wagering, seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Santa Ana
tribe in New Mexico prohibit wagers on home-state colleges, and
another five states plus Virginia prohibit some form of proposition
bets on college athletics.
5. States that do not impose limitations on sports wagers
The states that have refrained from imposing limits on sports
wagers include Arkansas,230 Michigan,231 Mississippi,232 Montana,233
Nevada,234 New Mexico,235 North Carolina,236 Pennsylvania,237 and
West Virginia.238
Shortly after a failed effort in 2000 by the NCAA and Senator
John McCain to ban sports wagering on college and amateur sports,
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 491-13.1(99F) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4039 (2020).
230. Arkansas voters approved Issue 4 on the November 2018 ballot, which approved
casino gaming and included sports betting. See Notice for Constitutional Amendment
Proposed by Petition of the People, Issue No. 4, https://www.sos.arkansas.gov/
uploads/elections/Issue_4_for_Website.pdf, (last visited Oct. 27, 2021). Per the Rules of
the Arkansas Racing Commission, “[l]icensed sports pools” in Arkansas may “accept
wagers, including parlay card wagers, as to which of the participating contestants will win
specified sports events and as to whether the total points scored in a specified game, match,
or similar sports event will be higher or lower than a number specified for that event.” Ark.
Racing Comm’n Rule 20.120(1)(a)(2), https://www.dfa.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/
racingCommissionOffice/ArkansasCasinoGamingRules.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
231. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.403(bb) (West 2020).
232. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-5(gg) (2020).
233. S.B. 66-330, 2020 Sess., § 2(10), (13) (Mont. 2020).
234. Nev. Gaming Comm’n, Regul. 22, §§ 22.120, 22.1205 (2018).
235. New Mexico tribes, with the exception of the Santa Ana Tribe (which does not take
wagers on New Mexico colleges), do not impose limitations on legal sports wagers.
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-292.2(e)(3) (2019).
237. 4 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13C01 (West 2017).
238. W. VA. CODE § 29-22D-3(2), (14), (15), (22) (2018).
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the Nevada Gaming Commission “lifted a long-standing ban on
gambling on Nevada college sports teams . . . .”239 At the time, the
NCAA vowed to “continue its drive to pass nationwide legislation
prohibiting all betting on all college sports . . . .”240 Though invited
to participate in the regulatory hearing, the NCAA failed to make
an appearance.241 After two decades and the legalization of sports
wagering in twenty-nine states not much has changed at the
NCAA. It is interesting to note that since Nevada has allowed
wagers to be placed on its collegiate sporting events, there have
been no integrity scandals involving sports betting at Nevada
colleges or universities. Other jurisdictions, where sports betting
has been illegal, have not been so lucky.
B. Federal Lobbying
The NCAA has a proclivity for running to Congress to solve its
problems, pushing for federal legislation.242 Indeed, the NCAA and
its affiliates spent close to one million dollars in Washington D.C.
lobbying federal lawmakers to maintain the status quo regarding
student athletes and NIL, despite the expansion of these rights for
college athletes in state legislatures.243 The NCAA spent another
$690,000 in 2019 hiring lobbyists, more than has been spent since
2014.244 It is perhaps not surprising that the NCAA would seek
solutions at the federal level where it appears to have an outsized
ability to influence the process as opposed to lobbying fifty
239. Kenn Ritter, Gaming Control Board Allows Betting on Nevada College Sports, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Jan. 25, 2001, 6:52 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2001/jan/25/gamingcontrol-board-allows-betting-on-nevada-coll; Ryan Rodenberg, NCAA Pivots to Address
Betting Integrity, ESPN (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/
id/26229344/how-ncaa-pivoting-address-sports-betting-integrity.
240. Ritter, supra note 239.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Dean Straka, Report: NCAA, Allies Spent Nearly $1M Lobbying Lawmakers in
2019, 24/7 SPORTS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://247sports.com/Article/ncaa-acc-big-12-spentone-million-dollars-lobbying-congress-against-likeness-laws-143636422/.
243. Id.; see also Staff, NCAA Stepping Up Lobbying Efforts as Congress Considers Allowing
Endorsement Money for Athletes, ALA. NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 10, 2020, 4:16 PM),
https://www.alabamanews.net/2020/02/10/ncaa-stepping-lobbying-efforts-as-congressconsiders-allowing-endorsement-money-for-athletes; Associated Press, NCAA, 2 Conferences
Spend $750,000 Lobbying Washington Lawmakers, CHI. SUN TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020, 10:25 AM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/2/11/21133166/ncaa-lobbying-washington-playercompensation (putting the figure at $750,000).
244. Straka, supra note 242; Staff, supra note 243.

425

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

different state legislatures where legislator turnover is more
frequent, and relationships are more difficult to maintain. The
efforts at the federal level may make sense from an efficiency
standpoint but seem a bit peculiar given that the bulk of NCAA
member schools are state institutions, and gambling is regulated at
the state level.
C. NCAA Position on Sports Betting Remains Unchanged
Despite the changes in the regulated sports wagering
landscape, the NCAA has been active in state legislatures across the
country as seen by the number of states with prohibitions on
wagers involving both home-state collegiate events and individual
collegiate athlete performances.245 The NCAA’s ongoing failure to
address the legal, regulated sports betting market, near total
opposition to sports wagering, and refusal to work with sports
wagering stakeholders only serves to drive the appetite for sports
wagering underground (particularly wagering on college
athletics), thereby feeding the illegal market.246
With almost half of the states legally regulating sports betting,
the NCAA’s continued opposition to engage with other sports
betting stakeholders continues to baffle. The owner of the
Washington Capitals and Washington Wizards, Ted Leonsis said,
Many ask if this decision [Murphy v. NCAA] will impact the
integrity of sports themselves . . . . I think it’s just the opposite.247
I think that the increased transparency that will accompany more
legalized betting around the country will only further protect
245. See, e.g., Ryan Rodenberg, From ‘Irreparable Harm’ to MoneyMaker: A Brief History
of NCAA Sports Betting Policy, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://
www.legalsportsreport.com/44380/ncaa-sports-betting-colorado-pointsbet (describing the
NCAA’s evolving approach to sports wagering).
246. See John Holden, How NJ Sports Betting Set Up a Potential Constitutional Problem for
Everyone, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 7, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32820/instate-nj-sportsbetting/#:~:text=The%20exemption%20of%20in%2Dstate,is%20also%20likely%20unconstit
utional%20favoritism (noting that exempting in-state teams may not only support the
illegal market but may also raise Dormant Commerce Clause problems); see also Steven
Flynn & Rick Parry, How to Build a US Gambling System That Protects the Integrity of
Sports (Key Takeaways from Great Britain), LAWINSPORT (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/how-to-build-a-us-gambling-system-thatprotects-the-integrity-of-sports-key-takeaways-from-great-britain (noting that cutting off
the liquidity of the illegal market is a key component to preventing match-fixing).
247. Kilgore, supra note 193.
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against potential corruption.248 They say sunlight is the best
disinfectant, and in this case I believe that is certainly true. 249

D. Despite the NCAA’s Animosity Toward Sports Betting, the NCAA
Attempts to Profit Financially
As part of its lobbying efforts during the 2019 legislative session
in Indiana, the NCAA, looking for an income stream, argued
“sports wagering operators should be required to use ‘records
maintained and authorized by amateur and professional sports
organizations’ to determine the outcomes of bets.”250 Or, in other
words, an “official data” mandate.251
More recently, the NCAA reversed its policy of prohibiting
championship competitions from being held in states that allow
single-game sports betting,252 namely Nevada.253 As a result of
NCAA host location expansion endeavors, Las Vegas will host its
first NCAA championship event in 2023.254
E. Integrity Efforts by Professional Sports Leagues, the NCAA, and
College Conferences Underwhelm
On the sports betting side of the equation, shortly after the
repeal of PASPA,255 the gaming industry created the Sport
Wagering Integrity Monitoring Association (SWIMA) to “detect
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Rodenberg, supra note 239.
251. For an overview of the concept of official data, see John Holden & Mike Schuster,
The Sham of Integrity Fees in Sports Betting, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 35–42 (2019).
252. Associated Press, Las Vegas to Host NCAA Tournament Men’s Regional for First Time,
ESPN (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/
30115461/las-vegas-host-ncaa-tournament-men-regional-first.
253. As more U.S. states continue to legalize sports betting, the NCAA’s reluctance to
host tournaments in jurisdictions allowing sports wagering is dissipating. Also, the location
of sites like Nevada as hot beds of sports bettors will likely translate into better attendance
at NCAA events. See Mark Anderson, NCAA Ends Ban, Paves Way for Las Vegas to Host Title
Events, L.V. REV.-J. (May 3, 2019, 9:22 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/
betting/ncaa-ends-ban-paves-way-for-las-vegas-to-host-title-events-1655310 (noting that
high profile events are attractive to bettors).
254. Id.
255. SWIMA was established in November 2018. Hilary Russ, First Sports Betting
Integrity Group Launched in United States, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2018, 4:04 PM),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/usa-gambling-sports/first-sports-betting-integrity-grouplaunched-in-united-states-idUKL2N1Y21I6.
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and discourage fraud and other illegal or unethical activity related
to betting on sporting events in the United States.”256 SWIMA’s
stakeholders include regulators (tribal, state, and federal),
sportsbook operators, law enforcement, and others involved in
sports wagering throughout the United States.257 U.S. Integrity
provides transparency into wagering around sporting events,
monitors social media accounts for sports organization staff and
players, and investigates betting-related corruption.258 Combining
the best of both worlds, U.S. Integrity acquired SWIMA in
July 2021.259
It is surprising that there is no corresponding organization(s)
for professional sporting leagues, the NCAA, and college
conferences. Adding further confusion to an already complicated
situation, there is no clear process for a coach, trainer, athlete, or
any other stakeholder associated with a sporting event to follow for
reporting allegations of integrity violations, suspicious activity, or
inappropriate contact. Indeed, there does not appear to be an
established process for reporting integrity concerns or suspicious
behavior to gaming regulators by sports betting stakeholders such
as athletic associations, colleges and universities, data providers, or
individuals within the sporting community. Nor is there a
recognized entity to serve as a single point of contact within the
sports community with the requisite authority and credibility to
manage integrity concerns and reports of suspicious behavior.
While the NCAA appears to have established a process for
reporting suspicious behavior and rules violations, information for
how to report concerns is scarce. The NCAA customer service
number appears to be the sole mechanism for reporting potential
sport integrity violations. The NCAA’s reliance on this siloed
process—which effectively sidelines regulators and other
stakeholders—is not helpful.
Perhaps unintentionally, the NCAA appears to have erected
obstacles that may be too difficult to overcome for any meaningful
reporting to occur. Though the NCAA has provided the public with
256. SPORTS WAGERING INTEGRITY MONITORING ASS’N, https://www.swima.net/ (last
visited Oct. 27, 2021).
257. Id.
258. U.S. INTEGRITY, https://www.usintegrity.com/services, (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
259. Telephone interview with Matt Holt, President and Founder, U.S. Integrity (Aug.
6, 2021) (concerning U.S. Integrity’s acquisition of SWIMA).
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a toll-based number for reporting suspicious activity,260 the
reporting mechanism amounts to little more than navigating a
customer service line at the NCAA office.261 For those subject
to NCAA rules and regulations, especially student athletes, the
fact that the phone number is housed at the NCAA’s offices alone
may prove to be too high a barrier to overcome for reporting
alleged misconduct.262
Best practices for compliance reporting include the use of a
third-party administrator, the ability to ensure confidentiality and
anonymity, provisions for multiple reporting channels with 24/7
access, the creation of detailed reporting systems, implementation
of appropriate security measures, and the ability to allow for
multilingual reporting.263
If the NCAA were serious about providing an effective
mechanism for integrity reporting, it could begin by aligning its
reporting process with best practices. Much more effective would
be the establishment of a third-party administered toll-free hotline
where potential integrity matters could be reported anonymously
24/7 with additional assurances of confidentiality. This would
increase the likelihood that top-of-mind concerns are reported
before those alleging integrity concerns or suspicious activity have
a chance to second guess themselves or lose their nerve. It would
also seem to be of enormous benefit, more in line with current
communication standards, and inexpensive to create an online
reporting portal, thus establishing an additional communication
channel for reporting concerns.

260. On its website, the NCAA provides a phone number, 317-917-6008, for reporting
suspicious behavior and allegations of rules violations.
261. Reporting suspected NCAA rules violations is only one of the many functions the
phone number serves. Callers are placed in a customer service queue from which they can
select several options. The phone number is staffed Monday through Friday from 10:00 a.m.–
5:00 p.m. (EST) with no ability to leave a voicemail.
262. There is significant research documenting why incidents go unreported in a
variety of fields. See, e.g., S.M. Evans, J.G. Berry, B.J. Smith, A. Esterman, P. Selim, J.
O’Shaughnessy & M. DeWit, Attitudes and Barriers to Incident Reporting: A Collaborative
Hospital Study, 15 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 39 (2006).
263. Strategic Management Services, Best Practices for Maintaining an Effective Ethics and
Compliance Hotline (Feb. 2018), https://www.compliance.com/resources/best-practicesmaintaining-effective-ethics-compliance-hotline.
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F. The Value of Sports
Participating in organized sports and sporting events has many
benefits. Sports matter because valuable life skills are taught
including discipline, hard work, sacrifice, the value of practice and
preparation, how to set and reach for goals, how to manage
obstacles and prevail by overcoming adversity, how to deal with
failure and success, time management, teamwork, and what it
means to be part of something bigger than yourself.264 Sports matter
because they can change lives, provide children with positive,
influential role models, reveal and develop character, encourage
others to be their best self, help keep kids on productive pathways,
and give a voice to those without one.265 Finally, sports matter “for
every community that needs something to rally around.”266
G. An Independent Integrity Body Should Be Created for
Sports Organizations
An impartial, independent entity, free from the influence of
sports organizations, with the power to act outside of the
traditional sports environment, should be created. This entity
should be set up as a governing body and single point of contact
for all sports integrity matters. As a neutral independent
third-party, it should be vested with the authority to vet integrity
concerns and determine whether or not there is legitimacy to
concerns that are placed before it. Sufficient resources and the
ability to conduct investigations on its own initiative are critical in
order for the organization to maintain its autonomy and objectivity.
Confidential processes and whistleblower protections should be
established. Full cooperation from the various sports organizations
is essential for this body to the have the power to legitimately
resolve the matters that come before it. The ability to resolve
matters swiftly is also a necessity due to the digital environment—
where information can be shared with millions of people
264. Samantha Wagner, The Value of Sports: Through the Eyes of Athletes, REPORTER
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://reporter.rit.edu/sports/value-sports-through-eyes-athletes; Pat
Cavanaugh, Come Ready or Never Start, COME READY OR NEVER START (Oct. 8, 2008),
https://comereadyorneverstart.wordpress.com/.
265. John O’Sullivan, Why Sports Matter, CHANGING THE GAME PROJECT (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://changingthegameproject.com/why-sports-matter/.
266. Id.
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worldwide with the click of a button, without context, and with the
potential to affect reputations and cause irreparable damage.
Integrity in athletics is fundamental to spectator enjoyment.267
Nothing is better than watching talented athletes compete against
each other on a level playing field. The displays of talent and
moment by moment strategy are nothing short of spectacular,
particularly during high stakes events such as tournaments and
championships. Everyone, from the athletes to the coaches to the
fans, wants the assurance that there is an equal opportunity to be
victorious. “Integrity in athletics goes beyond playing by the rules
of the game or respecting a referee’s ruling. True athletic integrity
requires athletes to remain competitive without seeking methods of
advancement that lack morals and ethics.”268 Athletic organizations
should work to strengthen their programs by assessing where
potential weaknesses lie and shoring up resources to provide
needed support.
H. Inherent Threats to Sports Integrity
Much has been made of the external threats to sport such as
match-fixing, point-shaving, and trading insider information.
What has received little to no attention are the internal threats to
sports activities from athletes, coaching staff, officials, misuse of
inside information, and inadequate gambling education and
awareness programs.269
1. Athletes
Very few athletes go on to compete at the professional level.
While “[m]ore than 480,000 compete as NCAA athletes . . . just a
select few within each sport move on to compete at the professional
267. The idea that sports results are unknown, a concept referred to as “uncertainty of
outcome” is fundamental not only to spectator enjoyment but commercial success. See David
Forrest & Robert Simmons, Outcome Uncertainty and Attendance Demand in Sport: The Case of
English Soccer, 51 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 229, 229–31 (2002) (describing the concept of
uncertainty of outcome).
268. Admin, Sports and Character Series: Integrity, COMPETITIVE EDGE ATHLETIC
PERFORMANCE CTR. (June 22, 2017), https://www.competitiveedgeva.com/blog/sportsand-character-seriesintegrity/#:~:text=Integrity%20in%20athletics%20goes%20beyond%20playing%20by%20th
e,methods%20of%20advancement%20that%20lack%20morals%20and%20ethics.
269. See generally Preston & Szymanski, supra note 119 (describing various types of
cheating in contests).
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or Olympic level.”270 Based on research conducted by the NCAA,
the number of college athletes that go on to play professional sports
is very low.271 Baseball players have the highest likelihood, with
9.9% of collegiate baseball players playing professionally. Ice
hockey players have the next highest prospect with 7.4%. College
football players have just a 1.6% chance of playing professionally.
There is a 1.2% possibility that a male athlete playing basketball
will turn pro, while female basketball players, at 0.8%, have the
lowest probability.272
Of the major sports betting scandals that took place in the last
forty years, the majority of them involved collegiate athletes. In
exchange for cocaine and money,273 five Tulane University
basketball players agreed to shave points.274 Basketball players at
Arizona State conspired to shave points in four games.275 In another
point-shaving incident, basketball players from Northwestern were
indicted amid allegations that they “took money to insure [sic] that
the Wildcats lost by more than the point spread in three
games . . . .”276 Toledo Rockets football and basketball players were
involved in a point-shaving scheme. 277 An Auburn University
player was alleged to “have conspired with others to bribe or solicit
one or more individuals to influence an Auburn game,” trying “to
fix games,” and for offering money to his teammates.278 Three
270. Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competingprofessional-athletics (last updated Apr. 8, 2020).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra Table 1.
274. Todd Dewey, Las Vegas Bookmakers Know a Fix When They See One, L.V. REV.-J.
(Sept. 8, 2017, 2:19 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/las-vegasbookmakers-know-a-fix-when-they-seeone/#:~:text=The%201994%20Arizona%20State%20point,the%20integrity%20of%20the%20
games (noting that there is no record that any inside knowledge of the fix was utilized when
wagers were placed in Nevada).
275. Id.
276. Belluck, supra note 160 (there is no record that any inside knowledge of the fix was
utilized when wagers were placed in Nevada).
277. Dewey, supra note 274.
278. Scott Gleeson, Former Auburn Player Indicted in Point-Shaving Scandal, USA TODAY
SPORTS (June 4, 2013, 6:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/
2013/06/04/former-auburn-guard-varez-ward-indicted-in-point-shaving-scandal/2388831
(there is no record that any inside knowledge of the fix was utilized when wagers were
placed in Nevada).

432

433

Reshaping Sports Betting Education

players were kicked off the University of Texas El Paso team after
a bookmaker unsuccessfully attempted to recruit the players to fix
a game but could not get them to bet.279
When discussing the vulnerabilities of college athletes, Jake
Williams, former general counsel for the U.S. branch of
Sportradar,280 advised281
the NCAA and its member schools [to] beef up corruption and
integrity units and invest in education and monitoring. “To ignore
and not educate those types of athletes is going to be problematic
in the long run . . . . I hope the conferences, the schools and the
NCAA understand the scope and breadth of what’s required and
actively participate in making sure they’re doing everything they
can to protect their athletes.”282

According to Kenny White, vice-president of data integrity at Don
Best Sports,283 “Amateur athletes are at the highest risk because
there are no paychecks. They don’t make any money . . . .”284 The
collegiate match-fixing and point-shaving incidents underscore
how critical gambling education and awareness programs are.
While it is no small thing to compete in collegiate athletics, more
than 90% of collegiate athletes do not have the opportunity to
continue to compete professionally or at the Olympics
and effectively “retire” from high performance competitive
sports upon graduation.285 Collegiate gambling education and
279. Martinez, supra note 167. No significant bets were taken on the games with Nevada
sports pools and race books. There is no record that any inside knowledge of the fix was
utilized when wagers were placed in Nevada. Id.
280. See Jake Williams, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/jakelwilliams/ (last
visited, Oct. 27, 2021).
281. Sportradar gathers and analyzes sports and sports-related data. Its services
are purchased by various sports stakeholders including sports book operators, sports
organizations, and media companies. Sportradar has operations in several countries. Its
main office is located in Switzerland. SPORTRADAR, https://sportradar.us/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2021).
282. Sean Isabella, Sports Betting: Gambling Could Put Athletes at Risk, GET SET BEFORE
YOU BET, https://www.beforeyoubet.org/sports-betting-gambling-could-put-athletes-atrisk (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
283. Don Best Sports is a subscription-based service that provides real time sports
betting data and updates to sports book operators for line setting purposes. Don Best Sports
focuses on sporting events in North America. See DON BEST, www.donbest.com (last visited
Oct. 27, 2021).
284. Isabella, supra note 282.
285. It’s estimated less than two percent of athletes will turn professional. NCAA, supra
note 188.
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awareness programs should bundle resources around student
athletes and consider requiring every athlete to complete a
vulnerability assessment.
2. Coaches and coaching staff
Coaches are integral to sports programs and are responsible for
the development of athletes and the success of their teams. Coaches
can have significant influence in the lives of their athletes. If coaches
and coaching staff are not modeling good behaviors that include
ethics and values, those principles will not be important for
athletes. In its most recent research study, the NCAA learned that
“[f]ifty-four percent of NCAA men and 31% of women [currently
report that they] think sports wagering is a harmless pastime. These
figures are substantially higher (76% and 61%) among those
student-athletes who wager on sports.”286 At least twenty-five
percent of student-athletes believe coaches do not take the sports
wagering prohibition rules seriously.287 The perception that
coaches have little regard for NCAA rules on wagering is
significant in light of another research finding—”student-athletes
report that coach and teammate awareness/reaction is a significant
factor in getting student-athletes not to wager.”288
The University of San Diego (USD) point-shaving scandal is
particularly troubling because of the influence coaches and
coaching staff can have with collegiate athletes.289 A former
assistant coach “recruited” a star player “to influence the outcome
of basketball games in exchange for money.”290 Though the report
did not provide the details of the athlete’s compensation, he was
recorded “talking about how he wouldn’t shoot at the end of a
particular game because it would have cost him $1,000.”291 Once the

286. Trends in NCAA Student-Athlete Gambling Behaviors and Attitudes, NCAA 5 (Nov. 2017),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/wagering/2017RES_wageringexecutivesummary.pdf
[hereinafter NCAA Trends].
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See The Fix Was In: Crime in College Hoops, FBI: NEWS (May 20, 2013),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/crime-in-college-hoops/crime-in-college-hoops.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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scheme was exposed, the athlete was convicted and ended up with
a federal prison sentence.292
Perhaps dedicated resources around these issues and a robust
gambling education and awareness program for athletes, coaches and
coaching staff, trainers, the athletic department, and other collegiate
sport stakeholders could have resulted in a different outcome.
3. Officials
Veteran NBA official Tim Donaghy rocked the sports world
when he was indicted and sentenced to fifteen months in prison for
making calls that affected the point spreads and scores on games in
which he officiated.293 Donaghy also provided inside information
to gamblers and placed wagers on games he officiated.294
Bad officiating and league decisions were the unequivocal
answers to the query, “What is affecting game integrity and
outcomes regularly?”295 Analyzing the game behavior of officials,
referees, umpires, and others should be part of the scrutiny that
is regularly applied to sporting events. Timing matters. Officiating
before breaks in game play (between quarters, periods, or at
half-time) and in the final minutes of games should be also
reviewed for inconsistencies.
Leagues and sports organizations should create compliance
programs that go beyond simply creating a code of conduct.
Components of compliance programs must include enacting
mechanisms for reporting (suspicious activities and integrity
concerns), dispute resolution (to provide mechanism for
investigating claims, to initiate a complaint, and resolving
concerns), discipline (to provide a venue for the consistent
application of penalties for violations), process (to enhance
compliance by providing a venue in which to raise questions and

292. Id.
293. United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that
Donaghy pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to transmit
wagering information).
294. Donaghy Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison in Gambling Scandal, ESPN (July 29, 2008),
https://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=3509440. There is no record that any inside
knowledge of the fix was utilized when wagers were placed in Nevada.
295. Dustin Gouker, The Biggest Threat to Sports Integrity Is Not Betting, but Bad
Officiating, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/
35721/officiating-threat-to-sports-more-than-betting.
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provide guidance), and rolling reviews (to ensure the code is
consistent with current practices and concerns).296
In the multi-faceted construct that is described as sports
integrity, the call for increased transparency is getting louder, as
sports gambling analyst Dustin Gouker asserts, “[i]f the ‘integrity
of the game’ were really paramount to the leagues, I think we’d
have far more transparency and acknowledgment of problems with
officiating . . . but it’s more presented as a footnote to games as
opposed to some major threat to underlying game integrity.”297
As the NCAA considers updating its sports wagering
initiatives, they
will likely be tested by a myriad of integrity challenges that
college sports are now beginning to address in the shadow of the
Supreme Court’s decision [in Murphy] less than a year ago. Key
injuries, incidents involving fan interference and impactful lategame referee calls are the most recent examples. More will
inevitably follow.298

4. Insider information
Individuals that have the ability to influence the outcome of an
event or wager should be prohibited from placing sports bets. For
example, Nevada prohibits sports books from accepting or paying
wagers on “[a]ny sporting event or other event which the licensee
knows or reasonably should know is being placed by, or on behalf
of, an official, owner, coach, or staff of a participant or team or
participant in that event.”299 In addition to state laws, gambling
regulations, and NCAA prohibitions, colleges and universities
should adopt a code of conduct that articulates the proscribed
activities. Penalties for violations should also be clear.
Nobody, not the athletes, coaches, fans, bettors, or the
sportsbooks, gets a level playing field when insider information is
used to tilt the scales. Tim Donaghy allegedly personally benefited
for years through his use of insider information and his ability to
control outcomes. Pete Rose was said to have wagered as much as
296. Dave Dodge, Improving Code of Conduct Is a Good Start for Sports Officiating,
NASO|INTEGRITY RES. CTR. (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nasointegrity.com/improvingcode-of-conduct-is-a-good-start-for-sports-officiating.
297. Gouker, supra note 295.
298. Rodenberg, supra note 239.
299. Nev. Gaming Comm’n Regul. 22, § 22.1205(2) (2018).

436

437

Reshaping Sports Betting Education

$1 million (with illegal bookies) on sports.300 Though the
admissions about whether Mr. Rose bet on baseball generally, and
on the Cincinnati Reds specifically, while he managed them have
changed over time, Mr. Rose is subject to a lifetime ban from
baseball.301 These incidents illustrate why wagering restrictions and
prohibitions for insiders is critical.
5. Failure to provide an adequate gambling education and awareness
program
The NCAA currently offers some gambling education to
collegiate athletes through its “Don’t Bet On It” campaign.302 In its
most recent survey, NCAA Compliance Directors were asked how
familiar they were with “Don’t Bet On It.”303 While 75% of Division
I schools indicated that they are very familiar with it, only 44% of
Division II schools and 25% of Division III schools were very
familiar.304 In the nearly two decades since the NCAA was praised
for identifying potential risks of gambling and avoidance strategies
for athletes,305 it has failed to provide meaningful student-athlete
resources. The “Don’t Bet On It” student-athlete resources on the
NCAA website are minimal.306 Indeed, the entirety of the “Don’t
Bet On It” training appears to be meager, as the content can be
consumed in a mere fifteen minutes.307
Although the frequency of “Don’t Bet On It” training is unclear,
the adequacy of the program should be called into question and
addressed. It is an understatement to suggest that fifteen minutes
300. Rose Bet up to $1 Million, Bookie Says, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 25, 1989, 12:00 AM),
https://www.deseret.com/1989/4/25/18805262/rose-bet-up-to-1-million-bookie-says. No
Nevada sports pools or race books are known to have taken any direct action from Mr. Rose.
301. Pete Rose’s Ban from Baseball Remains in Place, ESPN (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/14365554/pete-rose-remains-banned-major-leaguebaseball-per-commissioner-rob-manfred-decision.
302. See NCAA SPORT WAGERING EDUCATION INITIATIVES: SURVEY OF COMPLIANCE
DIRECTORS, NCAA 6 (Jan. 23, 2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/
wagering/2020RES_NCAASurveySportsWageringEducation.pdf [hereinafter NCAA
SPORT WAGERING].
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. The Wager Vol. 7(18)—Don’t Bet on It: Curtailing Gambling Among Student-Athletes,
BASIS (May 1, 2002), https://www.basisonline.org/2002/05/the-wager-vol-7.html.
306. See NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
307. See Mowrer et al., supra note 21, at 388 (describing the length of the main “Don’t
Bet On It” program as being “about 15 minutes”).

437

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

of gambling education for a collegiate sports career that could span
four to five years is somehow sufficient.
Recent studies have indicated that “6% of college students in the
United States have a serious gambling problem that can lead to
psychological difficulties, unmanageable debt and failing grades.”308
Particularly problematic is that, according to experts and former
gamblers, “[s]ex, drugs and alcohol are commonly covered in
school and in the coming-of-age conversations that parents have
with their children, but discussions about the consequences of
gambling are rare . . . . This can lead young people to
underestimate the addictive nature of sports betting and other
forms of gambling.”309

IV. EXTERNAL THREATS TO SPORTS INTEGRITY
Integrity in sports is something that needs to be safeguarded.310
All stakeholders, particularly those responsible for the outcome of
an event such as coaches, officials, and athletes, should be aware of
how challenges to sports integrity may be presented. Effective
education and awareness programs help sports stakeholders
develop the necessary tools to bolster integrity.
The National Council for Problem Gambling (NCPG) released
some staggering statistics311 revealing that “[u]pwards of 80% of
high school students report having gambled for money.”312 Among
youth ages fourteen to twenty-two, sports betting is the most
popular form of gambling.313 Corroborating this data is the even
more compelling data from the NCAA which professes that 90% of
male and 82% of female student-athletes who wager on sports
placed their first bet before entering college.314 An NCAA study
from 2016 found:
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Alfred Archer, On Sporting Integrity, 10 SPORT, ETHICS & PHIL. 117, 117 (2016)
(calling integrity fundamental to sport).
311. Though research dates are not referenced, the Executive Director for the National
Council on Problem Gambling confirms that the data is updated and refreshed on an
ongoing basis.
312. SPORTS GAMBLING FACTS AND STATISTICS, NAT’L COUNCIL PROB. GAMBLING,
https://158bvz3v7mohkq9oid5904e0-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/
01/Sports-Gambling-Facts-and-Statistics.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
313. Id.
314. Sports Wagering, supra note 20.
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Thirty-one percent of NCAA men and 14% of NCAA women
gamblers had their first such experience prior to entering high
school. Only 12% of men and 31% of women in the 2016 survey
who had ever gambled indicated that they first gambled in
college. . . . Although playing cards for money was the most
common gambling entry point for current NCAA men, we are
increasingly seeing sports wagering being cited as their first
gambling activity.315

A. Athlete Education Programs
1. NCPG—Safer sports betting initiative
Recognizing that more could be done to educate athletes of all
ages, the National Council on Problem Gambling created the Risk
Education for Athletes Program (REAP).316 REAP was “an
advocacy project designed to reach millions of youth and
athletes.”317 Its mission was to “educate athletes of all ages about
the personal and professional risks involved with gambling and
other risky behavior and to encourage good decision making.”318
After the Murphy decision, REAP was rebooted and assimilated
into the Safer Sports Betting Initiative.319
2. Collegiate education programs—NCAA—Don’t Bet On It (2005–
present)
NCAA’s own research shows student-athletes are gambling
despite the NCAA’s stated policy of abstinence.320 The NCAA
reported on a “Wagering Impacts Well-Being” graphic that almost
a quarter of male student-athletes engaged in sports betting within
the last year.321

315. NCAA Trends, supra note 286, at 2.
316. See Risk Education for Athletes Program, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
riskeducation4athletes (last visited Oct. 27, 2021); Risk Education for Athletes Program, NAT’L
COUNCIL PROB. GAMBLING, https://www.ncpgambling.org/programs-resources/programs/
risk-education-for-athletes (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
317. Risk Education for Athletes Program, supra note 316.
318. REAP was designed explicitly for athletes by experts in gambling, sports, sports
wagering, and problem gambling. See id.
319. See id.
320. Sports Wagering, supra note 20.
321. Id.
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In a survey of collegiate compliance directors conducted by
the NCAA about its Sport Wagering Education Initiatives,
ninety-seven percent of coaches, ninety-eight percent of athletic
administrators, and ninety-nine percent of student-athletes at
Division I schools confirmed some form of gambling related
education was provided.322 The same schools completed a
better-than-eighty-percent rollout of gambling-related education to
athletics healthcare providers.323 Unfortunately, “some form”
appears to be a catchall phrase, and it is unknown whether or not
an assessment of the various gambling-related educational
programs was conducted.
In order to provide an efficacious educational program, the
NCAA must address a variety of concerns identified by its
member-school compliance directors.324 Some of the impediments
include the NCAA’s stale polices relative to sports wagering; the
“Don’t Bet On It” campaign (which is largely viewed as
“outdated”);325 the perception that NCAA rules are too broad
relative to societal norms326 and are viewed as “negatively
impacting the credibility of any [gambling] education
provided[;]”327 that student-athletes, coaches, and staff see no harm
in betting on professional sports, especially fantasy offerings or
“March Madness bracket contests[;]”328 the perspective that the
NCAA should focus on itself and prioritize rules around college
sports wagering and inside information instead of other issues; the
NCAA’s position on “fantasy and low-stakes pro sports
wagering[;]”329 that compliance staff feel they “lack the time,
resources and expertise” to address mental health;330 and finally,
that the NCAA gambling educational efforts may not be as

322. NCAA SPORT WAGERING, supra note 302, at 2.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 8.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. It would seem that compliance staff could cross-collaborate with experts across
their campus or bring in experts. Perhaps college athletics have the wrong funding priorities
such as multimillion-dollar salaries for coaches and athletic directors as opposed to investing
in resources for student-athletes. Id.
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effective as hoped and “might be more impactful” if provided by
an outside source.331
V. A BETTER SYSTEM OF EDUCATION332
As regulated sports betting continues to expand, there is much
the NCAA can do “to reduce the chances of players finding it worth
the risk to shave points or throw games, should they feel their
integrity concerns are substantial enough.”333 If the NCAA, college
conferences, and colleges and universities want to bolster integrity
in college athletics, dedicated resources and impactful investment
in intuitive robust gambling education and awareness programs
which prioritize mental health are necessary.
When asked how the NCAA would be harmed by an expansion
of sports betting, NCAA President, Mark Emmert replied:
Our argument all along has always been within the NCAA, long
before I took this position, that we are opposed to all forms of
sports wagering . . . . We have a significant amount of experience,
over decades, to demonstrate that that’s the case. And to create
more of it simply enhances the threat that it poses to the integrity
of games, the impact that it has on our student-athletes, and to
university reputations.334

Despite the widespread legalization of sports wagering over the
past few years, the NCAA’s website continues to declare that
[s]ports wagering has the potential to undermine the integrity of
sports contests and jeopardizes the well-being of student-athletes
and the intercollegiate athletics community. It also demeans the
competition and competitors alike by spreading a message that is
contrary to the purpose and meaning of “sport[.]”335

331. Id.
332. Our observations are based on publicly available information. We do not suggest
that nothing is being done to protect college athletes. Indeed, individual schools have
undertaken their own education programs to educate college athletes. However, there is no
indication that any of the existing programs have been evaluated. The extent to which
individual efforts have been impactful and successful is unknown.
333. Does the NCAA Argument Against Legalized Sports Gambling Hold Water?,
COLLEGEAD (May 8, 2018), https://collegead.com/legalized-sports-gambling/.
334. Rodenberg, supra note 239.
335. Sports Wagering, supra note 20.
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As legalized regulated sports betting continues to grow and as
it becomes more easily accessible, the NCAA’s failure to adequately
address the legal sports betting landscape—by updating its policies
and investing resources in gambling education and awareness
programs—has the “potential to undermine the integrity of sports
contests and jeopardize[] the well-being of student-athletes . . . .”336
A recognition of the reality that sports betting is here to stay and
will continue to grow over the next decade is fundamental to
effective gambling education and awareness programs. The
NCAA’s approach to sports betting education now and for the past
several decades can be summarized as too little, too late.337
According to Dr. Brian Hainline, the chief medical officer for
the NCAA, “gambling is a medical concern that should be included
in any school’s educational efforts on student-athlete health and
well-being.”338 Yet in actual practice, what little gambling
education is provided to student-athletes focuses primarily on
sports wagering terminology and NCAA rules.339 Beyond these two
topics, there is a sharp drop-off in the number of schools that choose
to educate their athletes about state and federal laws (D1, 46%; D2,
16%; and D3, 21%), insider information policies (D1, 62%; D2, 20%;
and D3, 17%), and (with the fewest number of schools) gambling
addiction (D1, 21%; D2, 14%; and D3, 18%).340
One NCAA school in particular, the University of Missouri,
seems to educate its athletes beyond the NCAA “Don’t Bet On It”
campaign by explaining that “[p]athological gambling has been
reclassified from an impulse control disorder to an addictive
disorder; a behavioral addiction with both short-term and
long-term negative consequences” and that “[a]ddiction is a
primary, chronic disorder.”341 By identifying the problem, schools
like the University of Missouri are already ahead of other schools.
An easy area for significant improvement would be the recognition

336. Id.
337. Id.; see generally NCAA SPORT WAGERING, supra note 302 (describing the “Don’t Bet
On It” program).
338. Is Gambling Just as Bad as Doping? You Bet It Is, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/research/gambling-just-bad-doping-you-bet-it, (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
339. NCAA SPORT WAGERING, supra note 302, at 7.
340. Id. at 3.
341. Is Gambling Just as Bad as Doping? You Bet It Is, supra note 338.
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and provision of resources for mental health, problem gambling
awareness, and addiction by schools.
A. Best Practices for Sports Integrity, and Gambling Education and
Awareness Programs342
Collegiate and professional sports organizations should adopt
gambling education and awareness programs that establish a
consistent set of required topics, are delivered at regular and
frequent intervals, are comprehensive in nature, build upon and
reinforce previous content, and address gambling-related mental
health concerns.
One of the findings from the NCAA’s most recent study
involving trends in student-athlete gambling behaviors and
attitudes advised:
Continued enhancements and innovations in educational
programming are necessary to protect student-athlete well-being
and contest fairness. As gambling opportunities and technologies
continue to evolve and laws regulating the industry potentially
change, it will be important that educational programming for
student-athletes, coaches and athletics administrators be
continuously evaluated. To be maximally effective, this
programming needs to go beyond simply telling these groups not
to gamble/wager, given the deepening normative nature of
gambling and sports wagering in our society. These programs
should [assist] all involved in college athletics to recognize
[vulnerabilities] associated with sports betting, risk factors related
to problem gambling, provide up-to-date information on the
science and technology of gambling (e.g., betting lines are set
using a great deal of data along with extensive data/research;
gamblers can easily reach student-athletes through social media),
and . . . promote strategies for discussing perceptions and
normative expectations associated with gambling/wagering (e.g.,
being an athlete does not necessarily mean one has the insight
required to make money wagering on sports, as many studentathletes believe).343

342. The Sports Betting Integrity Forum’s White Paper, INTEGRITY CONSIDERATIONS
SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES, https://www.sbif.uk/images/Documents/IntegrityConsiderations-for-Sport-Governing-Bodies.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2021), served as one of
many inspirations for this section.
343. NCAA Trends, supra note 286, at 6.
FOR
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The NCAA’s Sports Science Institute’s Guide to Understanding
and Supporting Student-Athlete Mental Wellness also acknowledged,
“[w]e do need more prevention, education, awareness and treatment
programs for our youth and their parents.”344
Data from the NCAA also demonstrates that college and
university efforts to cultivate educational initiatives are “more
effective than just receiving materials from outside entities like the
NCAA staff.”345 Yet, despite the fact that NCAA-driven education
is one of the least effective ways to deliver gambling education to
student-athletes, when compliance directors were asked how likely
they would be to use educational resources on sports
wagering/gambling developed by the NCAA, 86% indicated they
would be likely or very likely to with more than 50% of D1 schools
indicating they would be very likely and an additional 37% in the
likely category.346 If effective gambling education and awareness
programs are to be developed, colleges and universities need to
create their own unique programs or have programs developed
specifically for them. Many schools have begun to embark on that
path and have created their own educational initiatives.347
However, there is no indication that critical components necessary
for a quality gambling education and awareness program have
been included in these individual efforts.
B. Minimum Requirements Should Be Established
Gambling education and awareness programs should deliver
consistent education around sports betting and mental health
issues. Content should be specific and based on the jurisdiction in
which the athlete competes; teach athletes how to manage
confidential sports-related information, such as undisclosed
injuries and game strategy; and provide resources for reporting
integrity-related concerns.

344. Jeffrey L. Derevensky & Tom Paskus, Mind, Body and Sport: Gambling Among
Student-Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/mind-body-andsport-gambling-among-student-athletes (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
345. NCAA Trends, supra note 286, at 6.
346. NCAA SPORT WAGERING, supra note 302, at 7.
347. NCAA Trends, supra note 286, at 5.
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1. Education delivery
Gambling education and awareness programs should be
delivered on a consistent, ongoing basis. At a minimum,
introductory student-athlete gambling education and awareness
training programs should be completed each year by studentathletes that are incoming freshman, transfer students, or new to
the college/university. Each returning student-athlete, whether or
not the athlete is competing or eligible, should participate in an
annual refresher course. Other refreshers should be provided as
appropriate, such as before significant games, upon entering
tournament play, if an athlete has been approached about
match-fixing or point-shaving, if integrity concerns come to light or
at other significant times such as surrounding championship events
that see increased wagering activity. Education delivery in this
format would perpetually remind student-athletes about crucial
issues related to gambling and sports betting.
Colleges and universities should also engage in vulnerability
and risk assessments to determine how susceptible the athletes in
their programs are to gambling-related challenges.
Gambling education and awareness programs should not be
limited solely to student-athletes. Coaches and coaching staff,
trainers, athletic department staff, university administrators, and
doctors and medical staff that work with student-athletes should
all receive gambling education and awareness training. Consistent
delivery of gambling education and awareness programs can help
form the foundation for a strong and mindful athletic community.
Quality gambling education and awareness educational
programs should also include an overview of the gambling laws
and regulations for the jurisdiction in which student-athletes
compete, including both permitted and prohibited wagers. For
example, in Nevada:
Wagers may be accepted or paid by any book on . . . [p]rofessional
sport or athletic events sanctioned by a governing body; [e]vents
held at a track which uses the pari-mutuel system of wagering;
Olympic sporting or athletic events sanctioned by the
International Olympic Committee; [c]ollegiate sporting or athletic
events; [o]ther events; and [v]irtual events. 348

348. Nev. Gaming Comm’n Regul. 22, § 22.120 (2018).
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[Wagers may not be placed on] [a]ny amateur sport[] . . . [a]ny
sporting event or other event [if] the licensee knows or reasonably
should know [the wager] is being placed by, or on behalf of, an
official, owner, coach, or staff of a participant or team or
participant in that event. . . . [and] [a]ny athletic sports event
sanctioned by a governing body where . . . a finding [has been
made that] the governing body is not effectively supervising such
event or is not ensuring the integrity of such event. 349

College, university, and athletic department policies regarding
gambling; use of insider information; personally identifiable
information; and medical information should also be discussed.
Colleges, universities, and athletic departments should
establish dedicated resources for student-athletes and others, such
as coaches and support staff, to provide information about how
student-athletes and others can access them. Information about
where to seek help for mental health concerns, problem gambling,
and other challenges should also be provided.
Finally, colleges, universities, and athletic departments should
discuss disciplinary processes, the penalties associated with violating
them, and any criminal laws that may apply as part of the training.
2. Information management
Privacy protection, data security, and information management
are becoming more important in our society. Educating
student-athletes about the types of information not to be disseminated
or discussed with anyone outside of the college or university team
ecosystem adds another layer of integrity protection.
Student-athletes may find themselves in precarious situations
as they simply go about their day-to-day activities. Unlike their
professional counterparts, gaining access to collegiate athletes is
relatively easy because of the nature of their environment. Colleges
and universities are open to the public and common areas are easy
to access. Professors, classmates, friends, family, members of the
community, and others all regularly interact with student-athletes
and could come into the possession of sensitive information.
The United States Department of Homeland Security defines
personally identifiable information (PII) as “information that
permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly
349. § 22.1205.
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inferred, including any other information that is linked or linkable
to that individual” regardless of citizenship status.350 PII is a form
of sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII) and includes
PII “which if lost, compromised, or disclosed could result in
substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to
an individual.”351 Teaching student-athletes, coaches and coaching
staff, trainers, athletic department staff, and university
administrators about PII and SPII, what each encompasses, and
why disclosures should not be made is another effective way to
prevent sports integrity issues. Attention should also be given to the
types of information that could be utilized for wagering purposes.
With the permissive environment that social media provides,
student-athletes should be counseled not to post any PII or SPII
about teammates such as medical or lifestyle information, as it
could inadvertently impact wagering odds and it can be difficult to
establish whether the social media engagement was inadvertent
or deliberate.
Learning to protect their own and others’ personal and health
information can help student-athletes avoid unintentionally
disseminating the type of information that sports bettors could use
to gain an advantage.
3. Integrity reporting
Dedicated time to discussing integrity challenges with
student-athletes is an essential component of any gambling
education and awareness program. Finding ways to openly discuss
sports integrity dilemmas in a safe environment can teach athletes
how to better navigate murky situations in a nonthreatening
environment. Role-playing can be a useful tool to illustrate how
student-athletes might be approached about participating in
point-shaving, match-fixing, or other illicit activities. Role-playing
activities can also provide student-athletes with the skills to rebuff
an approach and teach them how to properly report any such
attempts. Practicing real world examples will assist in keeping
350. HANDBOOK FOR SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE PII, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. 5 (Dec.
4, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs%20policy%20directive
%20047-01-007%20handbook%20for%20safeguarding%20sensitive%20PII%2012-4-2017.pdf.
351. Id. SPII includes social security numbers; driver’s license/state identification
numbers; citizenship or immigration status; medical information; and ethnic, religious,
sexual orientation, or lifestyle information in conjunction with the identity of an individual.
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student-athletes from becoming vulnerable to participation in
illegal activities or compromising the integrity of the events in
which they participate.
Crafting realistic hypotheticals that mirror previous
match-fixing, point-shaving, or integrity scandals can reveal how
student-athletes might react in a real-world situation, give insight
into their thought processes, and provide a forum for practicing
how to avoid harmful interactions.
Facilitating discussions about realistic ethical challenges and
analyzing the thinking processes behind how the student-athletes
approached the scenarios can provide context in the event the
athlete is ever confronted with a similar situation in real life.
Should a student-athlete become aware of suspicious activity or
an integrity violation, an effective gambling education and
awareness program should provide student-athletes with a single
point of contact and a uniform process for how and where to report
it. Such a process should adhere to best practices,352 including a
third-party administered whistleblower hotline.
The college, university, and athletic department disciplinary
processes should be made clear. However, student-athletes that are
approached about match-fixing or point-shaving and choose to
come forward, report the contact, and not participate in such
schemes should be free from any disciplinary or punitive processes.
Policies should be flexible enough to provide leniency for any
student-athletes that are or have been involved in illegal or
inappropriate activities for coming forward before they are found out.
Gambling education and awareness programs should include
frank discussion about the consequences of participating in illegal
activity such as match-fixing and point-shaving schemes or the less
obvious violations such as sharing insider information or personal
information about the team or individual athletes. Student-athletes
should understand the risks of engaging in match-fixing,
point-shaving, divulging insider information, and other
inappropriate behaviors. Clear policies about the consequences of
participating in such schemes, including the potential loss of
eligibility, scholarships, and stipends and the probability of filed
criminal charges, potential conviction, and possible jail or prison
time should serve as a deterrent.
352. See supra Section V.A.
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CONCLUSION
Legal regulated sports wagering is here to stay. More than half
of U.S. states offer legal sports betting. Match-fixing scandals have
been a part of the U.S. sports landscape for over a century, though
little appears to have been done to provide athletes, particularly
student-athletes, with the tools and resources necessary to
protect themselves.
As more states enter the legal regulated market, sports integrity
violations and suspicious activity will become clearer as odds
makers watch betting action, make adjustments to their lines, and
report concerns to U.S. Integrity for further evaluation. It is no
longer prudent for sports organizations to ignore the realities of the
environment in which their athletes participate. Instead of
fearmongering and ruminating about the illicit nature of sports
betting, the NCAA as well as colleges and universities should be
proactively engaged and fully participating partners.
To prepare student-athletes to more effectively navigate the
challenges that are posed by wagering on sports, the NCAA,
colleges, and universities should create or provide robust gambling
education and awareness programs. Adhering to best practices is a
smart, effective, and inexpensive first step. Additional resources
need to be dedicated to helping and supporting students, including
establishing gambling education and awareness programs, creating
information management techniques, and standardizing the
process for reporting concerns and potential violations. Support
structures and disciplinary processes need to be adaptive. An
environment where student-athletes are comfortable reporting
suspicious activities and potential integrity violations must be
cultivated if there is any hope in reducing or eliminating
match-fixing, point-shaving, and other illicit schemes that plague
collegiate athletics.
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